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Judge Wisdom and the 1952 Republican
National Convention: Ensuring Victory
for Eisenhower and a Two-Party
System for Louisiana
Joel William Friedman*
At the same time that John Wisdom was struggling to unseat John E.
Jackson and rebuild Louisiana's Republican Party, another southern attor-
ney, Elbert Parr Tuttle of Atlanta, was spearheading a movement to reform
and broaden the base of the Republican Party organization in Georgia.
Tuttle's efforts so impressed the national Republican Party leaders that when
John Wisdom asked Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, in the winter of 1951, to
recommend someone who had experience in a delegate challenge and who
might be able to advise him in his nascent Eisenhower effort in Louisiana,
Lodge immediately suggested Elbert Tuttle.
Wisdom took Lodge's advice to heart, called Tuttle, and Tuttle agreed
to take a Sunday train to New Orleans so that the two could compare notes.
Tuttle was well acquainted with the problems that Wisdom faced in
Louisiana. The Georgia Republican Party was run by a small clique of "Post
Office Republicans," the term used to describe those who became Republi-
cans "because they hoped that if a Republican [P]resident was elected, they
could name all the Postmasters and everybody that worked at the post office,
the district attorney and the marshals."
* © Joel William Friedman. Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. This article is
an adaptation of a chapter in the author's forthcoming biography of Judge Wisdom. The
author would like to thank his research assistants, Alexandra De Neve (Tulane 1997), Louise
King (Tulane 1996), and most importantly, Laurie Lowenthal (Tulane 1997) for their help.
Above all, the author is indebted to Judge and Mrs. Wisdom for their invaluable assistance
in providing a firsthand account of the events recounted in this article. Nevertheless, any
errors, inaccuracies, or misstatements are solely the author's responsibility. The companion
piece to this article detailing Judge Wisdom's role in the events in Louisiana that preceded
the 1952 Republican National Convention in Chicago appears at 69 Tulane Law Review 1439
(1995). ,
1. Interview with Elbert Parr Tuttle, U.S. Eleventh Circuit Senior Judge, in Atlanta,
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Wisdom and Tuttle spent much of the day in the garden of Wisdom's
magnificent home. Within a few hours, the two had forged a bond of per-
sonal friendship and professional admiration that would last for more than
forty years. "[O]f course I fell in love with the Wisdoms the minute I met
them," Tuttle recalled.2 They commiserated over the common obstacles that
lay in each of their paths and exchanged ideas about how to overcome these
hindrances and to promote the hoped-for candidacy of General Eisenhower.
Thereafter, Tuttle and Wisdom pushed forward on their separate fronts.
They subsequently joined forces in February of 1952 when Wisdom was
elected chairman, and Tuttle vice chairman, of the Southern Conference for
Eisenhower, a loose confederation of pro-Eisenhower leaders in the South
that became part of the move to draft Dwight Eisenhower for the party's
presidential nomination.3 The strategies exchanged during their initial
encounter, however, laid the groundwork for a grassroots movement that
eventually reshaped the southern Republican Party and played a pivotal role
in Dwight Eisenhower's capture of the Republican Party's presidential
nomination.
John Wisdom was already deeply involved with his Louisiana-based
Americans for Eisenhower and his joint effort with Tuttle and other south-
erners to promote the Eisenhower candidacy through their Southern
Conference for Eisenhower substantially before a corresponding organization
- Citizens for Eisenhower - was formed in February of 1952. In fact,
when a lieutenant in the Eisenhower national campaign initially telephoned
Wisdom to suggest that he organize the Louisiana effort, Wisdom assured
the caller that the Eisenhower campaign in Louisiana was already months
ahead of the national movement. Consequently, Wisdom is fond of recal-
ling, with an equal measure of pride, "We were for Eisenhower before
Eisenhower was for Eisenhower." Citizens for Eisenhower was headed by
Paul Hoffman, one of General Eisenhower's close personal friends who
wanted to expand the regional "draft Eisenhower" movement to the national
scene. This group, composed almost entirely of volunteers with little or no
experience in political campaigning, played an important role in promoting
Eisenhower's candidacy in the eyes of Democratic and Independent voters.
Unfortunately, its leaders did not have the experience or savvy to mount the
Ga. (Feb. 22, 1993) (transcript on file with author).
2. Id.
3. JAcK BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES 27 (1981); Ike Supporters to Open Office; Wisdom
to Be Chairman of Conference, TIMES-PICAYuNE, Mar. 2, 1952, at 19.
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kind of campaign that would be necessary to overcome the momentum that
already had been generated in favor of Senator Taft.
For several months before Eisenhower was persuaded to run for the
Presidency on the Republican ticket, four political and business leaders had
met on an irregular basis at the Commodore Hotel in New York City to
devise a strategy to draft the seemingly reluctant war hero. Early in the
game, every member of the team recognized the particular talent that each
brought to the enterprise, so once the campaign was organized, they easily
fit into their appropriate roles. At the core of the group was the professional
campaign organizer, Herbert Brownell, Jr. A keenly intelligent attorney and
former state legislator from New York, Brownell had managed the 1944 and
1948 presidential campaigns of Thomas Dewey. He also had served as
Chairman of the Republican National Committee and, in this role, had made
contacts with local and regional Republican leaders throughout the nation.
Brownell's close association with Governor Dewey's previous two unsuc-
cessful presidential campaigns, however, precluded him from assuming a
publicly visible leadership role in the Eisenhower movement.4 The same
was also true for Dewey. It was agreed, therefore, that neither Herb
Brownell nor Tom Dewey would be given any title, and no public announce-
ment of Brownell's crucial role in the campaign was ever released. Instead,
Brownell, a master nose-counter and political tactician, was assigned the
tasks of devising a strategy to attract the requisite number of convention
delegates and monitoring the delegate count. Dewey, the titular leader of the
party, was counted on to use his influence with the legion of Republicans
that remained loyal to him. The third member of this quartet was General
Lucius D. Clay, a native of Georgia and former Commander of U.S. forces
in Europe and Military Governor of Germany during the Berlin air lift. By
1952, General Clay had retired from the armed forces and was in private
business serving as president of the Continental Can Company. A close
friend, advisor, and confidant of Dwight Eisenhower, he played the critical
role of liaison to the candidate. Of all the campaign leaders, Clay was the
only one who had the kind of relationship with Eisenhower that permitted
him to speak openly and candidly with the General about the state of the
campaign. It was General Clay who both forced Eisenhower to come to a
decision on whether or not to seek the nomination and convinced him in
April, barely two months before the commencement of the party's nominat-
ing convention, to publicly declare his candidacy.5
4. Interview with Maxwell M. Rabb, former U.S. Ambassador to Italy, in New York,
N.Y. (Feb. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Rabb Interview] (transcript on file with author).
5. HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BuRKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF
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The group's fourth member was Henry Cabot Lodge, the senior Senator
from Massachusetts and a highly respected descendant of a venerable politi-
cal family. On November 10, 1951, Clay, Dewey, and Brownell met with
Senator Lodge in New York and urged him to accept the role of chairman
and chief public spokesman for what they all hoped would become an
Eisenhower campaign. 6 A moderate Republican, Lodge could appeal to the
anti-Taft wing of the party. He also enjoyed the advantage of being
unconnected to the unsuccessful Dewey team. In addition, Lodge was a war
veteran, having resigned his Senate seat to enlist in World War H. Thus,
from Dewey, Brownell, and Clay's perspective, Lodge was the perfect
choice to act as the organization's point man.
The decision was not so simple, however, for Lodge. Accepting this
post would require Lodge to publicly align himself against Bob Taft, a
Senate colleague. Moreover, Lodge was up for re-election, and agreeing to
lead the Eisenhower effort would inevitably divert much of his attention and
resources away from his own campaign. And to further compound matters,
Lodge was being asked to make this public commitment to someone who had
not even agreed to become a candidate. In fact, many among the throng of
reporters attending the press conference in Washington where Lodge
announced his decision to lead the national Eisenhower for President
movement shouted "But you haven't got a candidate." To which Lodge
replied, "Well, if Eisenhower doesn't ... [become a candidate], then you
will have a great story because I will look very foolish. ",7 In the end, Lodge
paid a substantial price for his courageous decision to step forward, alone,
in favor of a noncandidate. He immersed himself in the Eisenhower effort,
spent much less time on his re-election drive than his staff wanted, and
ultimately lost his senate seat to a young Boston Congressman by the name
of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
For most tourists, the heart of Chicago is its beautiful north side. The
grandeur of Michigan Avenue, from the exceptionally fine Chicago Art
Institute to the row of expensive boutiques and grand department stores on
its "Miracle Mile," the bustling financial and legal communities surrounding
"the loop," the nightclubs on Rush Street, and the magnificent apartment
buildings of the "Gold Coast" with their impressive views of Lake Michigan
ATroRNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 102-03 (1993).
6. Id. at 90, 106; Rabb Interview, supra note 4.
7. Rabb interview, supra note 4.
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along Lake Shore Drive are natural attractions for the attentions of visitors
to this Windy City. However, in the summer of 1952 - July to be pre-
cise - the center of the political world and the eyes and ears of much of the
nation were focused three-and-one-half miles southwest of the loop. Here,
on the easternmost edge of the city's south side - surrounded by mammoth
stockyards, steel mills, and diverse ethnic neighborhoods populated by
thriving Irish, Greek, Slavic, and Italian communities - lay the Chicago
Convention Building and International Amphitheatre, the site chosen by both
parties to host their 1952 national conventions.
The Republicans came first. Ninety-six years earlier they had gathered
in Philadelphia for their first national convention and nominated John C.
Fremont to run, unsuccessfully, against James Buchanan. This defeat, how-
ever, did not prevent Chicago from becoming the party's favorite gathering
site. The 1952 convention - the Republicans' twenty-fifth - would mark
the party's thirteenth appearance' in Carl Sandburg's "City of the Big
Shoulders. 9 The previous conclaves included the turbulent session in 1912,
when Teddy Roosevelt and President William Howard Taft locked horns in
a delegate fight eerily premonitory of the contest that would ensnare that
President's son forty years later.
At nearby Comiskey Park, local baseball fans gladly endured the
sweltering mid-ninety-degree temperatures to watch their second-place White
Sox make a midseason charge at the hated frontrunning New York Yankees.
For the visiting conventioneers, however, the arid, sun-scorched days of this
Chicago summer were significantly less tolerable. Fortunately for them, the
12,000 seat convention hall was the first completely air-conditioned situs in
convention history. The International Amphitheatre had been built for live-
stock shows and rodeos and, as such, was a fitting place for the upcoming
political roundup."0 Herds of delegates would soon be corralled within this
huge hall which "smelled like the old bull ring at Juarez" prior to the instal-
lation of the air-conditioning system. 1 For several raucous and chaotic
days, they would be swept up in a political stampede whose ferocity would
match any of the arena's previous contests and leave a majority of them,
paradoxically, physically drained yet emotionally reinvigorated.
For nearly a week prior to the arrival of most of the delegates - long
before they would begin the business of choosing a candidate and adopting
a platform - significant preliminary work already was being undertaken by
8. World Affairs, 12 FACTS ON FILE 213, 216 (1952).
9. Carl Sandburg, Chicago, in CHICAGO POEMS (1916).
10. DAVID W. REINHARD, THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT SINCE 1945, at 85 (1983).
11. Id.
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several critically important committees. As to these proceedings, the eyes
of an interested public shifted from the stockyards to a more central location
within the heart of the nation's second city. Here, among the packed ball-
rooms and private suites of the 3000-room Conrad Hilton Hotel - formerly
known as the Stevens - gathered an odd mixture of political professionals
and novices, Republicans from small villages and large metropolises. In
clandestine caucuses and casual corridor conferences, as well as in stuffy,
smoky salons and bustling ballrooms teaming with reporters eager for any
hint of an impending breakthrough, the delegates spent grueling days exam-
ining evidence and witnesses and engaging in endless and spirited debates.
Nearly all of this intensive activity centered around a trio of disputes that
most insiders realized was likely to affect, if not resolve, the increasingly
bitter battle between the two contenders for the presidential nomination,
Senator Robert Alphonso Taft and General Dwight David Eisenhower.
This was only the second time in its 100-year history that the GOP
convention would experience a floor fight over delegates. 2 This previous
episode, separated by two score years from the current controversy, was
strikingly similar in a couple of ways to its latter day counterpart. The
earlier contest pitted the Bull Moose supporters of Theodore Roosevelt
against followers of Senator Taft's father, the incumbent President, William
Howard Taft. 3 And in 1912, as in 1952, one of the focal points of the
struggle was the issue of the voting rights of contested southern delegates.14
President Taft eventually emerged victorious from his battle and, not coin-
cidentally, also garnered his party's nomination.' 5 However, the dispute
proved costly for the Republicans in the end, as the divisions it engendered
led directly to the Progressive Party revolt of Theodore Roosevelt and con-
tributed significantly to the general election victory by the Democratic chal-
lenger, Woodrow Wilson. 6 Clearly, Robert Taft hoped for a much different
outcome in 1952.
Herbert Brownell was keenly aware of this piece of party history.
Several weeks before the convention began, he had begun to devise a strat-
egy designed to garner the nomination for his candidate, General of the
Army Dwight Eisenhower. Brownell was a former Chairman of the party's
National Committee and had been the campaign manager for Tom Dewey's
presidential campaigns of 1944 and 1948. Widely respected among party
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professionals as a campaign strategist, Brownell's primary responsibility in
the Eisenhower campaign was to fashion and implement a plan to amass and
retain a majority of the convention delegates. After meeting with delegations
from states across the country, it quickly became clear to Brownell that the
job, although difficult, was feasible. Eisenhower would have to overcome
the significant lead that Taft had built as a result of his unquestioned national
stature and the campaign that his followers had mounted since the early
months of 1950.'" By the eve of the convention, Taft's count had increased
to 504, just 100 short of a majority."
To overtake the frontrunner, Brownell realized that he needed to seize
upon a dramatic moral issue that would appeal to those delegates and voters
who were more ideologically compatible with the Ohioan's approach to the
major issues of the day than they were with the policies advanced by
Eisenhower. In consultation with Boston attorney Ralph Boyd,' 9 Brownell
came up with a theme that he believed would do the trick - one that he was
convinced would make the delegates feel that they were participating in a
cause that went to the heart of the democratic process.
It was common knowledge among political operatives and other serious
campaign watchers that substantial challenges were likely to be mounted
against the delegates chosen to represent several southern states, particularly
those from Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana. Brownell, who had come to
develop a keen ability to count noses, sensed that by the time the convention
was held in mid-July, the contest for delegates between the two major candi-
dates would be quite close - probably within sixty or seventy votes - and
that the balance of power at the convention could rest in the hands of the
delegates from these three southern states. ° At the same time, however,
national party rules put Eisenhower in a bind. Nearly all of the delegates
from states with old guard national committeemen supported Senator Taft.2
For Eisenhower to turn the tide, these delegates would have to be replaced
by the insurgent factions that supported his candidacy.
However, the power to decide delegate contests resided initially with the
party's National Committee and Credentials Committee, both of which were
controlled by Taft supporters. Obviously, Brownell knew that he could not
expect much assistance from this quarter. Further, although party rules
17. See JoHNR. GREENE, THE CRUSADE: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1952, at 73
(1985).
18. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FnFTIES 211 (1993).
19. BROWNELL&BURKE, supra note 5, at 111.
20. Id. at 114.
21. See id.
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permitted an appeal from the decisions of these committees to the convention
floor, it was unlikely, in Brownell's judgment, that a sufficient number of
delegates could be convinced to overturn the judgment of the committee
leadership. This would certainly be the case if, as mandated by the extant
party rules, contested delegates were permitted to vote on all seating contro-
versies including their own. Brownell was faced with a daunting challenge.
To accumulate the 604 votes needed to secure the nomination, Eisenhower
needed the support of the southern delegations that were controlled by Taft
supporters. This meant that the delegations recognized by the southern state
parties would have to be replaced by the challengers who were committed
to Eisenhower. Yet, this could be accomplished only by a successful
challenge at the convention, and probably not until the matter was brought
for decision to the convention floor. Moreover, convincing a majority of the
delegates to take the unusual step of delegitimizing and disenfranchising
members of a state delegation would not be easy.
Brownell's intuition told him that he needed to change the way in which
the delegates viewed the southern delegate contests. If each challenge was
perceived as simply another internecine squabble between rival gangs of
local fat cats, most of the otherwise disinterested delegates would be loathe
to intervene. The delegates had to become personally involved with the
struggle of the challengers. This could be accomplished, Brownell thought,
if they sensed that the insurgents were involved in something akin to a moral
crusade. He needed to arouse and appeal to the delegates' emotions, to
make them feel that this battle represented more than the quadrennial clash
of personalities and egos, and to show that there was more at stake here than
a selfish lust for power and position. If the delegate qualification fights, and
ultimately the nomination contest itself, were not perceived in this fashion
and were, instead, resolved on the basis of traditional affiliations and policy
issue predilections, defeat was probable.' Brownell had to make the dele-
gates believe that they were essential members of a movement devoted to
preserving the democratic nature of the nominating process.
Accordingly, Brownell predicated the success of his entire convention
strategy on one objective - changing the party rules that permitted contested
delegates to vote on all seating questions. As a former National Committee
Chairman, Brownell was familiar with the history associated with prior
conventions and knew that the 1912 convention had been marked by a
delegate contest. He also realized, however, that the bitterness engendered
by the seating controversies had spilled over into the postconvention cam-
22. See id.
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paign, deeply dividing the party and contributing to its defeat in the general
election. It was critical, therefore, that he develop a strategy that would
garner the nomination without causing an election-threatening party schism.
With this in mind, Brownell quietly stole away from campaign head-
quarters and, for a full week, holed up in the New York City Public Library
poring over the transcripts of the 1912 convention's minutes and contempo-
rary accounts of the surrounding events.' His research convinced hhn that
securing the nomination would be dependent upon a successful challenge to
the rules that had been adopted at that convention. In 1912, Temporary
Chairman Elihu Root had ruled that all delegates listed on the temporary
roll, regardless of whether their seats were being contested, were entitled to
vote on all matters, including the qualifications of other delegates.24
Brownell also came to realize, as John Wisdom had known from the
outset, that to overcome the delegates' natural inclination to reject seating
challenges, the challengers would have to present a carefully prepared argu-
ment supported by convincing and thorough legal briefs. He had discovered
that while Teddy Roosevelt's arguments in 1912 consisted of little more than
vague, unsubstantiated charges of thievery and fraud, the successful Taft
forces had presented their case in a lucid, organized, lawyerlike fashion.
This time, the tables would need to be turned. "We would not repeat Roose-
velt's mistakes," Brownell promised himself.'
Little did Herbert Brownell realize how prescient this observation would
turn out to be. Forty years after the father's supporters had successfully
rebuffed a viscerally oriented challenge to the party rules with a formal,
legalistic response, the son's backers relied to a significant degree upon a
casually delivered, ill-prepared defense to this renewed confrontation.
Meanwhile, having learned history's instructive lesson, the opposition's
venture, spearheaded by John Wisdom's Louisiana team, overwhelmed the
convention. In stark contrast to John E. Jackson's rambling, off-the-cuff
performance, Wisdom wowed his audiences with a thoroughly researched,
carefully crafted, intricately prepared, and precisely delivered argument that,
by design, bore all the earmarks of an experienced trial attorney's presenta-
tion to a jury.
Brownell was convinced, however, that Eisenhower's drive for the
nomination could not rely solely on a legalistic challenge to the credentials
of the southern delegates. Senator Taft controlled the party apparatus, and
23. Interview with Herbert Brownell, former U.S. Attorney General, in New Orleans,
La. (Apr. 7, 1994) [hereinafter Brownell Interview] (transcript on file with author).
24. Id.
25. BROWNELL & BuRKE, supra note5, at 111.
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 33 (1996)
Brownell's meetings with delegates from across the country had persuaded
him of two inescapable facts. First, Eisenhower trailed in the delegate
count. Second, the political ideology shared by a majority of the uncon-
tested delegates was more akin to Taft's than to Eisenhower's.' Thus, any
serious attempt to produce a significant shift in delegate support had to
capture the imagination of the convention. A limited focus on the merits of
their entitlement to the southern seats would not do the trick. More was
needed; the effort had to be characterized in a way that would appeal to the
delegates' basic commitment to the notion that everyone should play
according to an evenhanded set of rules. The delegates had to be persuaded
that the Eisenhower cause was a campaign for the heart and soul of the party
and that, in this struggle, Eisenhower occupied the moral high ground.
During the convention, Brownell and the members of his team encoun-
tered a couple of opportunities to develop and cultivate this image, but the
pivotal moment came early, and Brownell knew exactly what had to be done.
He instructed the campaign's official manager, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
of Massachusetts, to have an Eisenhower supporter propose a change in the
party rules that would preclude contested delegates from voting on their own
qualifications and those of other contested delegates. Such a change was
necessary, they would insist, to comport with the party's obligation to impart
justice and fair treatment. Thus was born the idea of the "Fair Play Amend-
ment."
Convincing the delegates to adopt such a Fair Play Amendment was
only the first stage of a two-part plan. If and when this rule was to be adop-
ted, the Eisenhower team had to be prepared to persuade the uncontested
delegates to vote in favor of seating the pro-Eisenhower slates in Texas,
Georgia, and Louisiana. The success of this second phase of the campaign
strategy, in turn, depended heavily on the talents and abilities of the
Eisenhower leaders in the three key southern states. Eisenhower's forces in
these states would have to come to the convention not only with clean hands,
but with a truckload of ammunition. Unless they could document their
claims to delegate status and repudiate each and every attempt by the Taft
forces to retain their seats at the convention, the effort would fail and the
nomination would be lost. Similarly, to accomplish their initial objective -
adoption of the Fair Play Amendment - Eisenhower's proponents would
have to persuade the delegates that they had played strictly by the rules and
that their counterparts from the Taft campaign were trying to subvert the
process to suit their selfish ends.
26. Brownell Interview, supra note 23.
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For a few hours on the morning of June 30th, one day before the
party's National Committee was scheduled to begin its deliberations on the
delegate challenges, there was renewed talk of a compromise to end the
conflict over the three southern delegations.' Later in the day, however,
statements by spokesmen for the two camps dashed all hopes for an amicable
settlement?8 Senator Taft and his campaign directors proclaimed their desire
to compromise, a claim derided by Eisenhower's men as hypocrisy. These
purported attempts at reconciliation, according to Eisenhower's men, were
merely a pretext for the steamroller, which, they urged, like Old Man River,
"don't say nothing, it just keeps rolling along."29
Nevertheless, after a couple of days of haggling, the two sides were
able to work out an agreement governing the amount of time each would
receive for the presentation of its case to the National Committee. At about
ten o'clock that evening, a committee composed of Republican National
Committee Chairman Guy Gabrielson; Monte Appel, a D.C. lawyer repre-
senting Senator Taft; and Sinclair Weeks, a national committeeman from
Massachusetts who represented the Eisenhower group, announced the results
of their negotiations.3" They agreed to allocate ninety minutes per side in the
Texas and Louisiana contests because these contests were of signal im-
portance to the rival candidates.31 Thirty minutes were granted to each side
in the cases involving disputed delegates from Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Mississippi, Missouri, and if necessary, Puerto Rico.32
After Chairman Gabrielson made the announcement, Senator Lodge
proclaimed that his group would continue to try to obtain permission to
broadcast the hearings over television and radio.33 In response, Gabrielson
stated that the question of television and radio broadcasting would be decided
by the 106-member National Committee at its 10 a.m. meeting the next
day?8 At his news conference, Senator Taft indicated that he was willing to
27. W.H. Lawrence, Both G.O.P. Camps Bar Compromise On Delegate Issue, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 1, 1952, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Thomas Sancton, Warnings of Past Haunt GOP Convention Leaders, NEW ORLEANs
ITEM, July 6, 1952, at 1, 12.
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have the hearings televised and had so informed the National Committee.35
Despite these remarks, however, the Taft campaign leaders and their surro-
gates, including Committee Chairman Gabrielson and a controlling majority
of the National Committee members, continued to press their opposition to
the broadcasts.
On Tuesday morning, July 1st, the members of the National Committee
gathered in the Hilton Hotel, the site of the committee's offices and both
candidates' headquarters. The committee's first order of business was to
resolve the broadcasting controversy. Upon their arrival in the North Ball-
room, the committee members discovered that their meeting room was
jammed not only with television and motion picture cameras, bright lights,
and electric cables, but also with hundreds of Eisenhower partisans." Rather
than create a scene with the media by asking them to remove their equip-
ment, the committee chose to shift its proceedings down to the dim and quiet
of the Boulevard Room.37
The short delay occasioned by the change of site did not, however,
affect the anticipated result. Despite the candidate's public support of media
coverage of the committee hearings, and over the objection of Taft floor
manager and Wisconsin Republican boss Thomas Coleman, 8 one of Taft's
chief lieutenants, Congressman Clarence Brown of Ohio, led the fight to bar
media coverage of the delegate contests. The Taft supporters displayed their
control as the National Committee voted sixty to forty late in the day on July
1st to prohibit television and radio broadcasting of its hearings on delegate
contests.39 This decision was a defeat for Eisenhower and his backers in the
first important, albeit preliminary, test vote.' ° Although far from fatal, it
reinforced their sense that they were in for a fight and that they would have
to marshall all of their resources to prevail in the convention's main event.
Paradoxically, however, the defeat encouraged Taft's team to pursue a
strategy that would ultimately work to Eisenhower's advantage. By
constantly seeking, and being perceived as seeking, to keep the public's eyes
shielded from the committee's deliberative process, the Taftites reinforced
Eisenhower's claim, and the growing public perception, that Taft was
35. Id.
36. Robert Howard, Spurns 'Order' by Dewey for TVat Hearings, CHI. TRIB., July 2,
1952, at 1.
37. Id.
38. How the Eisenhower Victory Was Achieved ... , NEWSWEEK, July 21, 1952, at 23.
39. W.H. Lawrence, G.O.P. Chiefs Bar Delegate Hearings to TV and Radio, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1952, at 1.
40. Id.
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secretly attempting to steal the nomination. In addition, this initial
confrontation between the Taft and Eisenhower camps previewed a recurring
pattern that would both bedevil Taft's cause throughout the convention and
contribute to Eisenhower's subsequent string of preliminary victories and
ultimate capture of the nomination. The Taft forces were continuously in
disarray while Eisenhower's team presented a united, thoroughly prepared
and organized front.
The Eisenhower camp, in keeping with their strategy to depict the Taft
forces as opponents of a free and fair convention and, thereby, to bring
public opinion to bear in favor of the pro-Eisenhower southern delegations,
fervently supported every effort to encourage broadcasting. Not only would
broadcasting provide the public with access to evidence of the tactics that
Taft leaders had used in "stealing" southern delegations, particularly in
Texas and Louisiana, but it would once again allow Eisenhower to portray
himself as being on the side of the angels, to build delegate support for his
cause, and even, perhaps, to elicit some sympathetic treatment from the
media.4' Unfortunately for Senator Taft, his own public declarations of
support for opening the process to public viewing went largely unnoticed,
drowned out by the din of his supporters' incessant antibroadcasting
campaign. Perhaps Taft's official position was merely a smokescreen
intended solely for consumption by the general public. Yet, whether it was
an honest reflection of his views or mere electoral camouflage, Taft's
staffers ignored the candidate's public statements and succeeded in
convincing nearly all of his supporters on the National Committee to follow
their lead. They voted to prohibit the radio microphones and television
cameras because, they maintained, the presence of all of the needed
equipment would impede their ability "to judge the contests in a calm and
dignified atmosphere. "42
Ingenuity and perseverance, however, ultimately triumphed over the
bureaucratic obstinance of the Taft-controlled National Committee. From
Tuesday through Thursday, a group of media representatives met with party
officials in an attempt to get them to reconsider the National Committee's
decision. During their discussions, Orville Sather, the manager of technical
operations for CBS television, was left waiting outside the mirrored doors
of the North Ballroom. He used the time to good advantage, however,
spending most of those many lonely hours hatching a clandestine scheme to
break the "glass curtain."'43 On Thursday evening, hours before the
41. BROWNELL&BURKF, supra note 5, at 115.
42. Lawrence, supra note 39, at 1.
43. See TVor Not TV, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1952, at 84 [hereinafter TVorNot].
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committee was scheduled to begin its deliberations over the Texas delegate
contest, three of Sather's technicians crept into the ballroom and planted two
tiny microphones in strategic locations hidden from plain view. 4 As a result
of this covert operation, CBS was able to record the entire committee hear-
ings on the Texas fight.4' And although the network did not yet have the
capacity to transmit the proceedings, an edited twenty-minute version of the
session's highlights was broadcast Friday evening on Edward R. Murrow's
newscast."6 In response to the criticism that CBS received for this subter-
fuge, its director of news and public affairs coverage, Sig Mickelson, replied
that his network's ability to record the proceedings established that it could
be done with "no fuss whatsoever."47
Two furtive efforts also were made to provide the public with radio
access to the committee's hearings. One enterprising reporter was able to
break the blackout by sneaking a microphone into the conference room and
hiding the wire under the rug. An equally inventive attempt was foiled,
however, when the microphone left dangling from a projection booth in the
committee's conference room smacked a committee member on the head.'
Eventually, however, the Credentials Committee, sensing the national
clamor to peer inside the smoke-filled rooms and smarting from the inter-
minable lambasting of the National Committee for its media blockade,
reversed the National Committee and voted to permit television, radio, and
newsreel coverage of its proceedings.
As a result of this decision, for the first time in American history,
between sixty and seventy million citizens throughout the nation were able
to view firsthand the workings of a national political convention. One hun-
dred and six stations49 broadcast the spectacle over the nation's four major
networks to eighteen million television sets across the country, reaching
nearly forty percent of the total population. And the audience was treated
to more than a firsthand view of the proceedings. Thanks to the appearance
of what became known as a "walkie-lookie," viewers could literally look the
44. See id.
45. Net Airs GOP Fuss from Secret Recording, ATLANTA CONST., July 5, 1952, at 1
[hereinafter GOP Fuss].
46. TVor Not, supra note 43, at 84.
47. GOP Fuss, supra note 45, at 1.
48. The Eye of the Nation, TIME, July 14, 1952, at 21, 23 [hereinafter Eye]. The
offending newsman was summarily evicted. Id.
49. Sixty-five of the sixty-six cities with television stations participated in the nation-
wide broadcast. KOB in Albequerque was the sole exception.
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participants right in the eye.' The National Broadcasting Company took this
opportunity to showcase its first portable television camera - a battery-
powered unit that consisted of a ten-pound camera and a fifty-pound back-
pack transmitter." The compactness and portability of the unit permitted
their camera operators to record scenes in places that were theretofore
inaccessible to traditional camerasYn Commentary was then provided either
by the cameraman or by a reporter who stood in front of the camera and
spoke through a walkie-talkie to a base unit where the two signals were
combined. 3
The decision by the Taft campaign leaders to stonewall the issue of
public access to committee hearings was the first of what would become a
collection of tactical blunders. Throughout the convention, either ill-con-
ceived or incompetently handled decisions eventually backfired and worked
to the advantage of the Eisenhower cause. The Taft-orchestrated decision
by the National Committee to ban broadcasting, for example, ensured that
virtually every television and radio station in the country would, as they did,
bombard the airwaves with broadcasts criticizing this decision and linking
it to the Taft campaign. It also provided the Eisenhower camp with hours
of free publicity and an unparalleled opportunity to reach the entire nation
with its claim that the exclusion of pro-Eisenhower delegates from the
temporary roll of the convention by the National Committee amounted to
"political thievery." The committee, and by implication the Taft candidacy,
was charged with operating behind an "Iron Curtain," and this message was
sent into millions of homes via television or radio.
The dispute over broadcasting took so much of the National Commit-
tee's time that the only other matter it was able to resolve on the first of July
was the dispute over the Florida delegation.'M By the next morning, the tele-
vision cameras and lights had been removed from the North Ballroom and
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the committee was able to reconvene in its originally designated site. The
committee's revised schedule indicated that the entire morning session would
be allocated to the contest over the Georgia delegation.
Outside the frenzied atmosphere of the Hilton Hotel, burly stockyard
workers wilted under the strain of unseasonably high temperatures. As the
mercury rose in thermometers throughout the city, ultimately recording a
record-tying temperature of 97.8 degrees Fahrenheit, the climate was not
much more comfortable inside the North Ballroom. There, even without the
searing klieg lights, tempers flared as the feverish debate commenced over
this emotionally charged confrontation.
The battle for the right to represent Georgia at the convention was
fought between the self-styled "regular" delegation headed by Roscoe Tucker
and a rival group led by Roy G. Foster, Sr. The Tucker delegation favored
General Eisenhower by a fourteen-to-three margin, and its claim to legiti-
macy was predicated on the fact that it had been recognized as the state's
delegation in the two prior national conventions. The pro-Taft Foster con-
tingent, on the other hand, had been certified as the legitimate delegation by
a Georgia Superior Court ruling. On July 2nd, the National Committee
rejected Tucker's claim for recognition and voted sixty-two to thirty-nine to
seat the court-backed Georgia delegation that pledged to cast all seventeen
votes for Taft.'5 The decision was made secretly, according to the commit-
tee's previous decision to bar television and radio broadcasts of its proceed-
ings. Reporters were allowed to attend the hearings, but could not use their
cameras, and they were told to leave when the committee began its delib-
erations.
The committee's resolution of the Georgia contest engendered some
vocal opposition, including a challenge from what most observers viewed as
an unexpected source. Senator Richard Nixon of California publicly pledged
to vote for Governor Warren, but secretly worked feverishly with Lodge to
procure California votes for the Fair Play Amendment. 6 Nixon stated that
"the Georgia decision raised an issue of whether the Republican convention
would be conducted with complete integrity and fair play. "I Nixon said he
was convinced that.the pro-Ike delegation from Texas had to be seated if the
GOP was to survive. In his judgment, the issue was bigger than the fight
55. W.H. Lawrence, Kansas Vote Goes to Ike in Lone Victory, ATLANTA CONST., July
3, 1952, at 1.
56. See 1 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: SOLDIER, GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
PRESIDENT-ELECT, 1890-1952, at 537-38 (1983).
57. W.H. Lawrence, Committee Seats Taft Georgia Bloc by 62-to-39 Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1952, at 1.
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between Ike and Taft. "The real issue," he declared, "is whether the [GOP]
is to be a closed corporation [controlled by a small clique of politicians who
control the party machinery] or open to all people who want a change of
administration in Washington. "" Nixon probably did not realize how right
he was. When the dust had settled, it became clear that the engineer of
Eisenhower's defeat before the committee was a purportedly pro-Eisenhower
committee member from Georgia, national committeeman Harry Sommers.
Elbert Tuttle, attorney for the Tucker contingent, was flabbergasted.
As far as he was concerned, his pro-Eisenhower colleagues would have
carried the day with the National Committee if Sommers, "who had been
identified with us for eight years, had not switched in the middle of the
hearings to the contesting faction. "' The normally mild-mannered and taci-
turn attorney called Sommers' action "the most amazing double cross I've
ever experienced. "o Sommers, in turn, charged Tuttle and his associates
with betrayal. 61 He blamed the schism on a dispute that had arisen some
months earlier concerning the proper division of Taft and Eisenhower
delegates and insisted that Roscoe Tucker and Tuttle had tried to have him
removed as national committeeman.62 "My action was no surprise to Elbert
Tuttle," Sommers explained.63 "I told him twenty-four hours before the
meeting that I would not be in his corner. "I
The extended debate over the Georgia contest occupied most of the
committee's session on July 2nd. Now running behind schedule because of
the amount of time spent on the broadcasting controversy, the committee
optimistically scheduled hearings for July 3rd on the Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Missouri contests and delayed its review of the Texas challenge until the
Fourth of July.
Even before learning of Elbert Tuttle's unsuccessful appearance before
the National Committee, John Wisdom had enough experience with national
party leaders to know that he was facing an uphill battle. Wisdom already
58. Id. at 13.
59. Tucker Slate to Fight 'Double Cross' Seat Ban, ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1952,
at 1.
60. Id.
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had been rebuffed by Party Chairman Gabrielson barely two months earlier
in his attempt to get the party to investigate John E. Jackson's "un-Ameri-
can" tactics. Moreover, Wisdom's experiences at the state convention and
with the State Central Committee did not permit him to harbor any illusions
that his opponents would surrender quietly to the justice of his cause.' To
the contrary, the pro-Taft slate of Louisiana delegates came to Chicago brim-
ming with confidence and secure in the belief that their dominant position in
the party hierarchy was unassailable. Several of them even went so far as
to issue public pronouncements boasting about the inevitability of their
triumph and deriding the fortunes of their misguided opposition. "Jackson
has a big national name," his aide Van Buren Harris gloated.' "[H]e's
known at these national conventions, been a delegate five times. Do you
think a credentials committee at a convention examines these disputes? -
'Okay, buddy, tell your story. That's all. Okay, thank you, next case.'
That's what Wisdom will get at the national convention."'67 Baton Rouge
attorney and Taft-backer Brittmar Landry also chimed in, prophesying that
Wisdom "will get nowhere at Chicago. "68
Wisdom and his wife, Bonnie, left for Chicago about two weeks before
the opening of the convention. At the same time, a young attorney from
New York named Jack Wells also arrived in Chicago. Wells, along with
William Rogers, had been tabbed by Herbert Brownell to be the national
campaign's liaison with the Texas and Louisiana delegations. The two men
were members of a group of Republican attorneys in New York who had
worked with Brownell in the Dewey campaigns of 1944 and 1948.69 Wells
and Wisdom had a good working relationship, but there was little for Wells
to do prior to Wisdom's arrival in Chicago. The Louisiana statutes and
regulations governing the selection of delegates were so complex, and
Wisdom had displayed such a mastery of the process, that neither Rogers nor
Wells played any meaningful role in the activities in Louisiana that preceded
the national convention. Wells, however, did play a key role in Wisdom's
final preparation for his arguments to the committee members and conven-
tion delegates.
65. See Joel Win. Friedman, John Minor Wisdom's Battle Against the Political Bosses
to Create a Two-Party System in Louisiana, 69 TuL. L. REv. 1439, 1497-1510 (1995).
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Wisdom had completed the lengthy, thoroughly documented brief that
would be distributed to every committee member and convention delegate
prior to his arrival in Chicago. Nevertheless, there was still additional work
to be done to be fully prepared for his anticipated appearances in the Nation-
al and Credentials Committee meeting rooms and on the convention floor.
Wells suggested to Wisdom that these presentations would be aided by the
use of large visual aids to focus the committee members' attention on facts
and figures that were critical to Wisdom's argument. The pair began work-
ing sixteen-to-eighteen-hour days busily preparing and arranging for the
printing and reproduction of large, square charts and other exhibits that
measured between five and six feet in height. These visual aids had to be
large enough for the committee members to see clearly from a distance
because Wisdom intended to refer to them throughout his presentation to
depict precisely what had occurred at each local ward and district meeting
throughout the delegate selection process in Louisiana.
Once the brief and the visual aids were ready, the next step in Wis-
dom's carefully prepared strategy was to rehearse the entire presentation,
including the opening and closing statements and examination of witnesses.
As scheduled, the witnesses arrived in Chicago a few days before Wisdom
was scheduled to appear before the National Committee.
Someone wrote out the testimony in most cases for the witnesses, which
they more or less memorized. We had this kitchen clock that we gave
each witness, and I had a long pointer. I'd tap it on their heels when it
was time for him or her to stop testifying. We had at least two or three
dry runs - very, very carefully prepared with these very large visual aid
cards, giving the basic facts in brief and very, very succinct figures.
70
Jack Wells' contribution extended beyond his development and produc-
tion of visual aids. He spent many hours working closely with Wisdom on
a smaller version of Wisdom's convention brief, which they entitled The
Louisiana Story. 71 "[Wells] was very astute and a very well informed politi-
cal person, as well as being a good lawyer," Wisdom recalled. "[]e had
such a feeling for politics and such an understanding of the political game,
[that] it required very little time to educate Jack [to the intricacies of the
Louisiana situation]." ' The Louisiana delegation later demonstrated its
appreciation to Wells by giving him a gold watch. The watch contained an
70. Interview with Judge John Minor Wisdom, in New Orleans, La. (July 5, 1994)
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inscription "To the Man from Mars," the affectionate nickname that the
Louisianians had bestowed on Wells as a show of admiration for his extra-
ordinary abilities.
Wells's associate (and future law partner), William Rogers, perhaps
sensing that his assistance was not needed in Louisiana, concentrated his
efforts on Texas. He did, however, attend at least one of Wisdom's dress
rehearsals and was so impressed with Wisdom's carefully honed argument
and persuasive use of witnesses that he decided to completely revamp
Texas's convention presentation to mirror Wisdom's style. Unfortunately
for Rogers, the Texans had neither developed the detailed documentary
record nor attracted the number or diversity of witnesses that Wisdom had
prepared. Consequently, Rogers was unable to match Wisdom's perfor-
mance. As it turned out, however, the Texans never had to plead their case
on the convention floor. By the time the conventioneers were asked to vote
on the challenge to the Texas delegation, the Taft forces in the South had
been so devastated by the impact of Wisdom's presentation that they
abandoned their opposition to the Eisenhower slate.
The National Committee finally reached the Louisiana challenge on
Thursday morning, July 3rd. According to the agreement worked out
several days earlier with Party Chairman Gabrielson, each side was allotted
ninety minutes for discussion. Wisdom, assisted by fellow attorneys
Harold Judell of New Orleans, a former executive assistant to FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover, and Harrison Bagwell of Baton Rouge, a recent Republi-
can candidate for Governor of the state, presented the case for seating the
Eisenhower delegates. They challenged the legality of thirteen of the fifteen
pro-Taft delegates - the four delegates at large and those from the first,
second, third, sixth, seventh, and eighth districts.74 Wisdom intended to
prove to the committee that his "new republican leadership movement in
Louisiana" had operated within the rules and, with registered Republicans
only, had soundly defeated the Jackson faction in the January primary and
in the April mass meetings.75 Pro-Eisenhower delegates had prevailed,
Wisdom would tell them, in every congressional district where the New
73. W.H. Lawrence, Taft Forces Seat 16 More Delegates; Eisenhower Gets 3, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 1952, at 1, 9. Wisdom chose to reserve fifteen of his allotted ninety minutes
for rebuttal. Republican National Committee Chicago Convention, 1952: Hearing on
Contests 177 (July 3, 1952) [hereinafter National Committee Hearing] (unpublished
transcript, on file with author).
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at 1.
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Republicans opposed Jackson's pro-Taft slate. The state's eight congres-
sional districts were allotted eleven delegates, and Wisdom would seek
recognition for those nine delegates representing the six districts in which his
faction had emerged victorious. Additionally, by virtue of electing a
majority of delegates to the state convention, he would declare, his faction
was entitled to all four of the delegate-at-large slots. As promised, however,
Wisdom would not challenge the delegates elected from the two upstate
districts - the fourth and fifth congressional districts. Since the Eisenhower
candidates had been defeated fairly and squarely in those two elections, he
could not and would not seek to overturn the qualifications of the victorious
Jacksonites.
Wisdom had decided to approach this confrontation just as he had
handled so many court trials in New Orleans. He came to the hearing room
accompanied by mounds of copies of his 104-page brief, twenty-five exhib-
its, and a truckload of affidavits for the committee members. His remarks
were punctuated with repeated references to a series of large red and black
printed charts on white, thick cardboard. "We didn't use political speeches.
We presented our evidence in split-second fashion. We had dry runs and
timed our witnesses down to the second."
This type of effort, however, did not come cheap. At least one-third of
the members of Wisdom's delegation, as well as most of the witnesses who
were crucial to his argument before the party's National and Credentials
Committees, did not have the funds to pay for their travel, hotel, and related
expenses while in Chicago. There was also the significant expense associ-
ated with printing, transporting, and distributing the hundreds of briefs,
exhibits, and other documents that were the foundation of his presentation.
Yet because Wisdom's opponent, John E. Jackson, controlled the state party
treasury, the New Republicans had to look elsewhere for funding. For-
tunately, Wisdom had recruited such an angel for his team.
Nearly singlehandedly, Harry Latter, an English immigrant who made
a fortune in New Orleans real estate, raised the money needed to subsidize
the New Republicans's operation in Chicago. Although Latter was a regis-
tered Democrat, he had been persuaded by John and Bonnie Wisdom that
Eisenhower would make a better President than Adiai Stevenson.
We were aided enormously by having Harry Latter as [the New Republi-
can Leadership group's] treasurer. Harry raised the money for our cam-
paign in 1952 and 1956, and Harry was a tower of strength. He had
contributed very generously to a great many charities, so he could tele-
phone a guy and say, "Look I gave you $5,000 for your heart campaign,"
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or "I gave you $5,000 for your church" or "for your synagogue," and he'd
get a prompt response because he had been so generous .... 76
Now that John Wisdom finally had the opportunity to address the
party's National Committee, he was not about to mince or waste words.
Direct and to the point, he began his remarks before the National Committee
with a clear and emphatic statement of his baseline position. The New
Republican Leadership delegation, he insisted, represented "the only active
Republican [Party] in Louisiana."'" The stakes were high; the Louisiana
dispute was "not just another southern contest."78 It was a contest that
placed the party's democratic ideals on the line. As a result of the National
Committee's decision in the Georgia case, the party as a whole was on trial
before a jury of 160 million Americans. Wisdom urged the committee mem-
bers to compare the "shoddy tactics179 of the Jacksonite contenders designed
"to defeat the will of the voters '' 0 and work "a fraud on the [N]ational
[C]ommittee, "8 with the actions of his group, all of which had been in strict
conformance with Louisiana law and the rules of the Republican Party.
Through a series of witnesses, he established that his group had fairly elected
a majority of the delegates to the state convention but that a "kangaroo
court" Credentials Committee had replaced all of his rightfully elected dele-
gates with Jackson's pro-Taft cohorts.
In response, Jackson relied solely on a perfunctorily delivered oral pre-
sentation, rarely looking up at the committee members as he read from a
long, handwritten memorandum. He presented no witnesses and submitted
no briefs or documentation of any kind to the committee members.' To
Jackson, the entire matter was nothing more than a purely local dispute
between politically motivated rivals. He did not need to respond to the
issues on the merits because, Jackson blindly assumed, nobody would be
interested in themerits. It would simply be a question of politics as usual.
Jackson responded to a committee member who questioned whether his
faction had carried out the will of the majority of Louisiana Republicans:
"There are all kinds of majorities. You wouldn't count the heads of a mob
76. Interview with Judge John Minor Wisdom, in New Orleans, La. (June 23, 1994)
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when you were about to be attacked. You wouldn't just say 'I give up, I
surrender,' because there were a lot of people in the mob."I
As far as John E. Jackson was concerned, the New Republicans' claims
represented nothing more than a self-serving grab for power. Jackson's
group was the only legal Republican Party organization in Louisiana' 4
because it had always been the official party organization. Wisdom, on the
other hand, through his Americans for Eisenhower, "had made alliances with
the Democrats, persuaded many of them to change their registration to vote
Republican, and [was] attempting to usurp the authority of the regular organ-
ization. "5
Delivering his disconnected discourse at machine-gun speed, Jackson
took particular pains to inform the members of the National Committee that
the State Credentials Committee, empowered by the state convention to
investigate the competing claims, had acted lawfully and that the Eisenhower
forces had abandoned their appeal when they bolted the meeting before its
conclusion. When the Eisenhower group left the state convention, Jackson
explained, the Taft supporters proceeded to elect four delegates-at-large, as
they were entitled to do, and confirmed the election of district delegates.
Much to Jackson's surprise, his remarks elicited skeptical responses
from several of the members of what he had expected to be a friendly
audience. Many of the committee members, for example, displayed consid-
erable interest in Jackson's claim to the two delegate slots from the third
congressional district. Wisdom's presentation had left no doubt in their
minds that the Eisenhower candidates in the Cajun district had been elected
by overwhelming majorities. Jackson responded to some intensive cross-
examination by Fred C. Scribner, Jr., Maine's national committeeman, and
Representative Clarence J. Brown of Ohio by repeating his well-worn
refrain. The election of these two delegates had been set aside by the State
Central Committee after it had received evidence of irregularities in the
conduct of the meeting at which the election was held. Of course, Jackson
neglected to mention that the State Committee had disqualified these dele-
gates even though no challenge to their legitimacy had been lodged. After
Wisdom replied that the State Committee should be disregarded because it
had acted in the absence of a quorum, Jackson responded that the sum of
those members present plus proxies satisfied the requirements for a quorum.
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Reporters fortunate enough to cram into the packed hearing room were
treated to a display of oratorical flourishes rarely, if ever, heard in the
traditional humdrum of convention preliminaries. They reveled in Jackson's
contorted explanation of why several veterans of his delegations to prior
conventions had chosen to switch to the Wisdom faction in 1952. 6 Men like
New Iberian, sugar-planter Paulin Duhe, he replied, were merely seeking
"[t]he sophistry of dreams ... the fruits of political ambitions ...not
devotion to political duty, but diversion, pleasure and recreation in the
assembly of their friends gathered. "I Wisdom, of course, would not be out-
done. Pencils flew as he complained, "We have had hayrides in Louisiana.
But now we are being taken for a steamroller ride the like of which has not
been seen before. "88
The exhibition of rhetorical repartee also produced some of the con-
vention's lighter moments. During his presentation, Wisdom frequently
emphasized that the Jackson cabal had done everything in its power to keep
the size of the state Republican Party small in order to retain its control over
patronage. To make the point, he noted that Louisiana's financial contribu-
tion to the national party placed it fifty-first on the list of donors, "just ahead
of the Virgin Islands. "9 This remark immediately caught the attention of the
committeeman from the Virgin Islands, who playfully, but proudly, pro-
claimed, "Read the last report. We are ahead of you. "I The rising level of
tension was again temporarily relieved when Representative Clarence Brown
of Ohio, after surveying the five stylishly attired female witnesses whom
Wisdom had brought to aid his presentation, remarked, in his trademark
foghorn voice, "I don't like those Americans-for-Eisenhower in Louisiana
... [b]ut I sure do like those Girls-for-Eisenhower in Louisiana. ""
By the time that Jackson and Wisdom had completed their presentations
and responded to all of the members' questions, the committee had been in
session for more than four hours. The time for the morning meeting had
expired, but the members voted to move immediately into executive session
so that they could reach a decision before recessing for lunch.' Guy Gabri-
elson, who presided over the proceedings as committee chair, ruled that
because Louisiana's State Central Committee already had upheld the leg-
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itimacy of Jackson's claim to the district delegate seats from all but the third
district, Wisdom's challenge to these slots was out of order.93 His ruling
was sustained by a voice vote on appeal to the full committee. 4 As to the
remaining pair of delegates from the third district, however, a majority of
the committee agreed with John Wisdom. By a vote of sixty-one to forty-
one, the committee declared that the two delegates from the state's "sugar
bowl" properly belonged to General Eisenhower." Finally, the members
voted fifty-eight to forty-three to seat the four state-at-large delegates of John
E. Jackson's faction.9
Within minutes of the announcement of the National Committee's
decision, Wisdom and Jackson were surrounded by a barrage of newsreel
and television reporters in a corridor outside the hearing room. 7 In his first
television interview of the convention and in front of a nationwide audience,
Wisdom, visibly angry and growing angrier by the minute, shouted, "It's a
day of infamy! The Republican National Committee was tried and found
guilty. "98 Similarly dismissing the committee's decision to recognize two of
his delegates, Wisdom added, "They just threw a bone to a dog." At that
point, John E. Jackson was not about to permit Wisdom to monopolize the
attention of the television audience. He made light of Wisdom's charges by
suggesting that Wisdom's anger was to be expected of someone who had just
lost his case. "When a lawyer loses a case," Jackson smirked, "he can
appeal or cuss the court. Mr. Wisdom has chosen to cuss the court. "' Wis-
dom was not left without a reply. He retorted,
We have not lost this case. We have won this case before the American
people, and they're the real judges. It is now apparent why the committee
was afraid to have TV cameras and radio broadcast at the hearings. They
had already planned to steal these delegations for Taft. The Republican
Party is now on trial before 160 million Americans.1O°
By this time, neither of the two New Orleans lawyers could contain
himself as each sought to shout over the rehashed contentions and post-
93. See id. at 1.
94. Id.
95. National Committee Hearing, supra note 73, at 313.
96. Edgar Poe, Taft Supporters Win Most La.-Miss. Republican Seats, TIMEs-
PicAYUNE, July 4, 1952, at 1.
97. See Sancton, supra note 29, at 12.
98. State lke Faction Bitter over Decision, NEw ORLEANS ITEM, July 4, 1952, at 1
[hereinafter State Ike Faction].
99. Sancton, supra note 29, at 12.
100. Id.
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 33 (1996)
mortem prognostications of the other.' After several harsh exchanges,
Wisdom ended the interview with the assurance that he would appeal the
group's fight to the Credentials Committee and to the convention floor if
necessary.'°2 This, of course, was not an idle threat. Neither Wisdom nor
his assistants had harbored any serious hope of persuading the National
Committee to their side. They anticipated from the outset that the struggle
would be a long and difficult one and had prepared a coordinated series of
tactics specifically targeted to each step in the process. This experienced trial
lawyer, after all, knew precisely how to create a record for an appellate
tribunal, and at the National Convention, the next rung on the ladder was the
Credentials Committee.
An important component of Wisdom's strategy to exert pressure on the
Credentials Committee and the convention delegates to reverse the decision
by the National Committee was to create a groundswell of support from the
general public that would make any perceived perpetuation of the political
status quo difficult if not impossible. In keeping with this plan, Wisdom
urged members of his delegation to take their case to the national audience
that was becoming increasingly fascinated by its first view of this internecine
contretemps. "Shortly after the Louisiana steal," noted a correspondent for
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "there were signs that some of the delegates were
disturbed by these pressure tactics. Eisenhower supporters were making the
most of their reverses in the committee. They were taking their case to the
television cameras outside the hearing room." 3 One of the two alternates
from the second district, Murray Hurley, made several appearances on
television broadcasts in which she was able to promote the cause. Her co-
alternate, Elise Meyer, along with Violet Allen concentrated on meeting with
many of the female delegates in Chicago."° One of Wisdom's greatest assets
with both the press and female delegates, however, was his wife, Bonnie. A
woman of great style, high intelligence, and remarkable persuasive ability,
Mrs. Wisdom was particularly effective at convincing female delegates to
support Eisenhower. Her quick wit and charm also endeared her to many
newspaper columnists, which was of no small importance to the cause.
Many of the reporters who had sat spellbound throughout the proceed-
ings were not reluctant to report their reactions to what had transpired at the
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National Committee meeting. "Even cynical political correspondents won-
dered, before the vote was cast, whether the committee would have the gall
to hand the delegates to Jackson," wrote a St. Louis member of the guild.'
"They were agreed," he reported, "[that] the decision represented ruthless
machine politics at its worst.""
After Wisdom's expected rebuff at the hands of the National
Committee,"17 his decision to press his case outside the confines of the
committee meeting rooms was also adopted by other southern leaders of the
Eisenhower team. That Saturday afternoon, two days after the National
Committee's decision, Senator Lodge presided over a rally at the Blackstone
Theater across from the Hilton Hotel. There, Wisdom and Jack Porter, the
Eisenhower leader from Houston, were the featured speakers at a "Dixie
indignation rally" where they regaled the crowd with "the complete lowdown
on the 'big swindle' in Louisiana and Texas. "08 "It is now evident," Wisdom
exclaimed, "that the Taft forces are rattled. They don't know how high to
gear the steamroller that is already rolling. They have made a lot of people
mad, including a good many Republicans who ordinarily might have gone
along with them. '"" Wisdom also distributed a three-page statement, in
which he again relied on his preferred canine metaphor."' In the statement,
Wisdom charged the National Committee with "rigging the convention
beforehand with dummy delegates from Louisiana, Texas, and other southern
states. They tossed Louisiana a bone, to give the appearance of impartiality
and fair judgment. Two votes out of [thirteen] contests. Not a very large
bone at that. "11'
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On July 7th, more than 1,200 delegates responded to the call to order
as the official proceedings of the convention commenced. To accommodate
the tremendous public interest in this spectacle, nearly one-third of the floor
space had been reserved to members of the press. This meant that the 1,206
delegates, plus an equal number of alternates, were squeezed into the
remaining area through the use of cramped folding metal chairs packed
tightly into rows separated only by narrow aisles. The discomfort created
by these less-than-ideal physical conditions was compounded by, and perhaps
contributed to, the acrimonious debate that characterized most of the increas-
ingly protracted morning and evening sessions, many of which extended into
the early dawn hours.
One of the first orders of business was a vote on a so-called Fair Play
Amendment to the temporary rules of the convention, passage of which
Herbert Brownell viewed as the linchpin of Eisenhower's convention
strategy. The objective of this amendment was to preclude all disputed
delegates from voting on the seating of any challenged delegate. Brownell
and the other top leaders of the Eisenhower team originally had planned to
submit an amendment that would disenfranchise all delegates whose
credentials were in dispute."' Such a broadly phrased amendment would
have denied a vote to the disputed delegates from Florida, Mississippi,
Kansas, and Missouri,"' as well as those from Texas, Louisiana, and
Georgia. However, by the time the official proceedings of the convention
were to commence, nearly all of the members of the Republican National
Committee, including the Eisenhower supporters, had agreed upon a
compromise concerning the delegates from Florida, Mississippi, Kansas, and
Missouri."' Another political advantage also was to be gleaned from
limiting the reach of the amendment. The heads of two important delega-
tions, Governor John S. Fine of Pennsylvania and Arthur Summerfield,
Michigan's national committeeman, favored restricting the scope of the
amendment to delegates facing a "major contest.""' 5 By redrafting the
amendment to comply with the wishes of these two influential convention
players, Brownell hoped to attract the largest possible support for the Fair
Play Amendment. A wide victory margin on this pivotal preliminary vote
could provide the Eisenhower movement with a head of steam as it rolled
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towards the nomination balloting. And if Pennsylvania and Michigan
jumped on the Fair Play Amendment bandwagon, Brownell sensed that the
two delegations would stay on board all the way to the ballot for the
nomination. 16
The strategy worked. The amendment offered by Washington Governor
Arthur B. Langlie proposed that no temporary or disputed delegate, other
than delegates approved by two-thirds of the National Committee members,
be permitted to vote in the convention or in any of its committees until that
delegate's credentials be approved by a vote of the convention.1 7 Moreover,
each contest would be determined separately, and once a final decision were
rendered, the subject of that decision could vote on all subsequent seating
challenges."' Michigan gave forty-five of its forty-six votes to the Eisen-
hower-backed proposal, and the Pennsylvania delegation voted fifty-seven
to thirteen in favor of the amendment.
Senator Taft, meanwhile, was not unmindful of the devastating conse-
quences a defeat on this amendment could have on his drive for the presi-
dential nomination. He sensed that a defeat on the Fair Play resolution could
generate a pro-Eisenhower momentum that he might be unable to dissipate.
Consequently, he instructed his closest advisors to attempt to negotiate a
compromise with the Eisenhower camp by which they would agree to
withdraw the amendment in exchange for Taft's release of his claim to some
of the contested delegates. To that end, a group including California Senator
William Knowland, Congressman Carroll Reece of Tennessee (who had
succeeded Herb Brownell as National Party Chairman), Tom Coleman, and
Clarence Brown agreed to present Eisenhower's confidants with an eleventh-
hour proposal to split all contested delegates down the middle and thereby
eliminate any need to vote on the Fair Play Amendment. The plan was to
surprise the Eisenhower camp with a last minute concession tendered right
on the convention floor just prior to the anticipated introduction of the
resolution.
Over at Eisenhower headquarters, the brain trust spent the evening
preceding the convention's opening huddled in a late night strategy session.
Those present included the Big Four - Dewey, Brownell, Clay, and
Lodge - as well as Barak Mattingly (Eisenhower's chief supporter in the
Missouri delegation), Kansas Senator Frank Carlson, Jim Hagerty (who
would later become Eisenhower's press secretary), Brownell assistant Tom
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Stephens, and Max Rabb - the former chief of staff of Lodge's Senate
office and current assistant to the campaign manager." 9 Towards the end
of the session, each participant was asked if he wanted to make any final
comment. The last to speak was Rabb, a young but tough-minded Harvard
Law School graduate. After noting the manifest moral advantage that
Eisenhower would reap upon passage of the Fair Play Amendment, Rabb
posed a question that none of the other participants had theretofore con-
sidered. "What if they say," Rabb suggested, "we are willing to split the
delegations, we are willing to compromise?' There was almost a gasp in
the room as the collection of seasoned political veterans pondered the
ramifications of Rabb's insight. Lodge was the only one to reply: "[I]tjust
can't be, we just can't do it."'' With that, the meeting disbanded. No
specific response was formulated, but the participants left the room with the
sense that any compromise resulting in a withdrawal of the Fair Play
Amendment would deprive Eisenhower of one of his most potent weapons.
The next morning, Rabb's apprehensions were realized. As he, Senator
Lodge, and Tom Stephens were walking to their place on the convention
floor, "[a]lmost lying in wait ' 2 were Bill Knowland (chief spokesman for
the candidacy of Governor Earl Warren of California), Carroll Reece, Tom
Coleman, and Clarence Brown. After exchanging pleasantries, one of the
Taft men suggested that "what we better do is ... bring this party together
again. We've got to have harmony. So what do you say we compromise
50-50?"'1 Without missing a beat, Lodge proclaimed, "Gentlemen, I do
not consort with evil. " " As Lodge and the others turned on their heels and
walked away, Max Rabb was convinced that "that was the end of that.""
Taft was not prepared, however, to give up so easily. Moments before
the convention was to begin, he arranged for Guy Gabrielson to invite
Senator Lodge to his office in the hope that the party chairman could
convince the Eisenhower camp to eschew a divisive floor debate over the
Fair Play resolution. "6 The small, barely ventilated room was tucked away
in the wings behind a twelve-foot-high image of Abraham Lincoln"z' that
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hung above the gray-painted speakers' platform in the convention hall. The
portrait, painted by William Cogswell during the Civil War and depicting the
"great emancipator" as a brooding presence with "worry lines on his face
and determination on his mouth,"28 eerily reflected a sense of foreboding.
It was almost as if the image of this man who split rails was standing guard
lest any of his successors should preside over a conclave that would split his
party.
Lodge arrived to find himself once again confronted by Bill Knowland,
Tom Coleman, and Clarence Brown. Taft's campaign manager, David
Ingalls, was also there along with Chairman Gabrielson. Senator Knowland
opened the discussions by suggesting that although California's seventy dele-
gates would vote in support of the amendment, it was in everyone's interests
to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. 29
Clarence Brown then tendered the newest Taft proposal - if Lodge
would agree not to proffer the Fair Play Amendment, all of Senator Taft's
challenged delegates would voluntarily abstain and not vote on any seating
contests until their credentials had been permanently established. 3' This
proposal would accomplish the objectives of Lodge's amendment and would
insulate Taft from the potential embarrassment of a floor-fight defeat. 3'
Eisenhower's campaign managers, however, desperately wanted a roll-call
vote on the amendment. After all, Brownell's grand strategy was to
showcase the moral issue and to refuse all attempts at compromise. To have
yielded on this or any of the other issues as to which Taft's men were
prepared to bargain, Brownell had resolved, would compromise Eisen-
hower's moral position and undercut the foundation of Brownell's conven-
tion strategy to portray the Eisenhower camp as the agent of fairness and
democracy. As Governor Langlie told the delegates a few minutes later,
"Only through your vote can we prove to the American people that we prac-
tice what we preach when we attack corruption in our national government
and ask the people to trust us to lead our nation in the years that lie
ahead."' Lodge responded to Brown by requesting a brief recess so that
he could consider the offer and discuss it with Herb Brownell. A few
TRm., July 5, 1952, at 8.
128. Id.
129. See GREENE, supra note 17, at 108.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Douglas B. Cornell, Eisenhower Forces Score Triumph in Opening Test, TIMES-
PIcAYUNE, July 8, 1952, at 1, 8.
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 33 (1996)
moments later, Lodge returned to the meeting and rejected the proposed
compromise. 1
33
Before the meeting terminated, Lodge agreed to one concession sought
by Senator Knowland. He agreed to reduce the proportion of National
Committee votes needed to exempt any delegate from the voting ban from
eighty percent to a two-thirds vote.'3 This change, Lodge understood,
would have no impact on the underlying contest and would put him in the
position of appearing conciliatory to a leader of an important state delega-
tion. Thus, at 1:40 p.m., after a heated debate that lasted in excess of two
hours and that delayed the opening of the convention by an hour and three
minutes, the participants to the peace parley emerged "from their oven-like
chamber"' 35 to announce that their efforts at compromise had proven to be
unsuccessful. "We are taking the fight to the floor," 36 Lodge declared to the
members of the media pressed around the office door.
Meanwhile, on the convention floor, the delegates, unaware of the
reason for the delay in the proceedings, were being entertained by an organ-
ist who played a medley of state songs. "3' The loudest cheers erupted when
he began his rendition of Dixie.'38 The battle then began innocently enough.
Chairman Gabrielson strode from his office to the rostrum, yelled "O.K.,
boys," banged his two pound mallet 39 some 58 times,"4 mostly in response
to the pleas of a score of news photographers ringing the podium rather than
out of any need to maintain order, and called the convention to order."'
After the traditional opening ceremonies, including the presentation of colors
by members of American Legion Post 985 of Chicago, the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance, a spirited rendition of the national anthem by Rose
Bampton of the Metropolitan Opera, and the invocation, it was time to begin
the business of the party's twenty-fifth convention. 2 His eyes glued to a
new device - the teleprompter - making its initial appearance at a political
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convention, the pudgy Gabrielson delivered the ritualistic list of political
cliches. Then, with a slightly exaggerated eye to the brewing tempest,
intoned, "The fate of the world is in the hands of these delegates ......
Temporary officers were quickly elected without opposition. It was
now time to get down to the serious business of the opening session. Once
again, however, the Taft campaign was beset by another critical tactical
blunder. Immediately after exiting the unsuccessful conference in Gabriel-
son's office, Tom Coleman and Clarence Brown huddled together to formu-
late a new strategy to respond to Lodge's apparently unanticipated refusal to
compromise on the Fair Play issue.' 44 The duo agreed that the seven pro-
Taft Louisiana district delegates should be exempted from any effort to
disenfranchise contested delegates. '45 As far as they were concerned, these
delegates had been fairly chosen by the Louisiana State Republican Conven-
tion and, as the National Committee agreed, the state convention's proceed-
ings should not be questioned."4 The fact that the credentials of these seven
delegates had not been formally approved on the convention floor was irrele-
vant. The National Committee had uttered the final word when it ruled that
challenges to district delegates were limited to the State Central Committee.
The legitimacy of these delegates could not and would not be placed in issue
on the floor of this convention.
Having resolved that the seven Louisiana district delegates should not
be subject to the Fair Play Amendment, Coleman and Brown were left with
the task of figuring out how to accomplish their objective. However, there
was not a lot of time for contemplation. The amendment was about to be
presented, and they had to act and act now. So, in the midst of the con-
vention hurly-burly, the two concluded that the least risky approach would
be for Brown to assert a point of order immediately following submission of
the Fair Play Amendment. 47 Langlie's motion would extend to all thirteen
challenged Louisiana delegates. Brown would then request recognition from
the chair and insist that the State Republican Convention in Louisiana
already had ruled on the qualifications of seven of the nine challenged
district delegates." 4 Consequently, he would maintain, because the National
Convention had no authority to review the qualifications of these seven seats,
143. Eye, supra note 48, at 21.
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their status was not "contested. "149 As "uncontested" delegates, therefore,
they were beyond the reach of the Fair Play Amendment and permanently
in Taft's corner."
Resolution of the point of order would then be placed in the hands of
Chairman Gabrielson, who could be counted upon to uphold it.' The
Eisenhower forces would not dare challenge a ruling by the chair on a point
of order.' Even if they did, their only recourse would be to appeal the
ruling of the chair, an option not likely to succeed. The two Taft leaders
figured that the convention delegates were not about to overrule the first
decision made by the newly installed chairman. Surely, they presumed, the
delegates would be more reluctant to overrule the chair than to vote in favor
of a motion to seat particular delegates. Then, once the permanent qualifica-
tion of these seven Louisiana delegates was secured, the Taft camp would be
prepared, in order to avoid the possibility of a floor defeat, to support the
Langlie amendment. Unfortunately for Senator Taft, this scheme, hatched
in the midst of chaos, fell victim to a fatal combination of mismanagement,
an unyielding swirl of events, and bad luck.'
The party's 1944 vice-presidential nominee, Senator John W. Bricker
of Ohio, who had been informed of his assignment only ten minutes before
stepping up to the rostrum," moved to put the rules of the 1948 convention
into effect until a permanent organization was formed.55 Under these rules,
derived from Elihu Root's 1912 ruling, contested delegates were permitted
to vote on the credentials of other contested delegates, though not on the
question of their own seating. 56 Party Chairman (and temporary convention
chairman) Gabrielson of New Jersey then promptly recognized Governor
Langlie of Washington, who rose to propose his substitute rule excluding
sixty-eight contested delegates from Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana from
voting on all matters until their qualifications were finally decided.
According to their hastily devised plan, the portly Clarence Brown, a
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two previous, unsuccessful campaigns for the presidential nomination and
was known in Congress for his wit and facility with the quick and biting
retort, 1 7 was supposed to raise the point of order. Yet in the heat of the
moment, with the convention crowd in an uproar, he chose to alter the game
plan."5 Brown originally complied with Coleman's request, shouting "Point
of order!" However, this declaration drew such a fervent round of boos
from delegates throughout the hall that Brown stopped in midsentence.159
Sensing that the crowd was against him and fearful that Chairman Gabrielson
might seek to avoid charges of partisanship by overruling Coleman's
proposed point of order, Brown unilaterally decided to try a different
maneuver.160
Instead of asking for a ruling on the point of order and then supporting
the diluted Fair Play Amendment, Brown chose to amend Langlie's resolu-
tion. Proclaiming his desire to have the controversy settled by the delegates
"fairly, openly and without any mob psychology," 1 6 Brown moved to amend
the Langlie motion to preclude sixty-one of the sixty-eight contested
delegates from voting on seating questions. This motion, if passed, would
permit the seven Taft-supporting Louisiana district delegates to vote on
delegate contests. Unlike the point of order, however, it would not prevent
a vote on their own qualifications. In effect, then, Brown was asking the
convention to vote to create an exception from the Fair Play doctrine for
these seven, permitting them to vote while taking away the franchise from
sixty-one other contested delegates. Instead of casting Langlie and the
Eisenhower forces as the leaders of a movement to change traditional party
rules, Brown's amendment became the vehicle for the convention's vote. 162
To make matters worse for the Taft campaign, while Brown probably was
correct in his formalistic interpretation of the convention rules, the
Eisenhower strategy had already succeeded in shifting the focus of the debate
away from the language of the party rules and on to the merits of the larger
moral issue. It soon became apparent to many in the hall that this stratagem,
bred in desperation and confusion, was doomed to failure. Meanwhile, over
at his campaign headquarters in the Hilton Hotel, Robert Taft gasped when
he saw the telecast of his former lieutenant ambling to the rostrum. He
immediately realized that he would be unable to affect the unfolding series
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of events that would, in a short time, lead to the collapse of his presidential
drive. 
63
The convention hall was rocked for more than two hours by a harshly
passionate, bitter debate. Taft proponents maintained that the amendment
was nothing but a self-serving attempt by the General to garner additional
support. Meanwhile, Ike's legions contrarily charged that their opponents
were trying to freeze the status quo in order to protect delegates whose
credentials were subject to serious question and that a nominee chosen on the
back of such suspect delegates could not hope to win the general election in
November. Naturally, all of the partisan statements were seconded by
choruses of jeers and cheers from their respective supporters." Clarence
A. Barnes, a delegate from Massachusetts who openly opposed the leader-
ship of Senator Lodge in his state and who shortly would play a leading role
in this drama, castigated Lodge and others for complaining about a steam-
roller simply because they could not operate it. 65 This brought a thunderous
reply from Governor Dan Thornton of Colorado that nearly shattered his
microphone."6 And when Senator Lodge's brother John, the Governor of
Connecticut, delivered a blistering, belligerent attack on the Taft campaign,
many of Taft's supporters on the floor jumped to their feet and angrily shook
their fists in the Governor's direction.167 The final volley in this rhetorical
barrage was hurled by former federal Judge Charles I. Dawson of Louis-
ville, Kentucky, a man whose appearance clearly belied the intensity of his
remarks. 68 Dawson, a small, white-haired man in a rumpled suit,, walked
slowly to the microphone placed in the area as.signed to his state's delegation
and let fly with a string of adjectives excoriating the motivation of the
"change the rules" advocates. 169 By this time, however, most of the crowd's
energy had dissipated, and nearly everyone was ready for the dramatic call
of the states.
The roll call was commenced by Edward H. Alexander, Secretary of the
Illinois State Senate. 70 This seemed to re-energize the delegates, as his
efforts were frequently interrupted by verbal demonstrations, particularly
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when the large states cast their votes. Two states, New Jersey and Wis-
consin, demanded a poll of their members."7 But once the uproar subsided
and all the votes were cast on this tumultuous opening day of the conven-
tion's official proceedings, the delegates overturned the National Commit-
tee's ruling and gave Dwight Eisenhower his first decisive victory over
Robert Taft.173 The vote was 658 to 548 in favor of the Langlie amend-
ment,7 which meant that the entire delegation from both Georgia and Texas
and all but two delegates from Louisiana were disenfranchised. 1" This
represented a net loss of thirty-two votes for Senator Taft because fifty of the
seated delegates favored him while eighteen liked Ike. The passions gener-
ated by this debate and the strength of the 100-vote margin favoring candi-
date Eisenhower in this preliminary, but clearly critical, test of strength
between the candidates overshadowed even the impassioned oratory of the
evening session's keynote speaker - erstwhile dark-horse candidate and
General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. 17
General MacArthur, however, apparently placed more stock than did
most of his contemporaries in the possibility that a deadlocked convention
would turn to him for the nomination. One afternoon, Bonnie Wisdom
was making her rounds through the various suites in the Hilton Hotel search-
ing for delegates who she could swing over into the Eisenhower camp, when
she and her companions were stopped dead in their tracks. "I heard this
mellifluous voice coming out over the transom as I walked along the
hall . . . It was MacArthur's acceptance speech being rehearsed by Mac-
Arthur... The only audience he ever had was right outside of his room in
the hotel!"1
Three days after the passage of the Langlie amendment, the delegates
voted 683 to 513 to incorporate its Fair Play provision into the party's
permanent convention rules. This vote was a direct result of the impact that
John Wisdom had made on the National Committee. In addition to adopting
the fair play resolution, the conventioneers amended the permanent rules to
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fying every contested issue of law and fact as part of a more elaborate
procedure designed to expedite credentials disputes. 78
On a more immediate level, however, the vote on the Fair Play Amend-
ment represented the first clear indication that Brownell's strategy was
working and that the mood of the convention was shifting. Although not all
of the delegates who voted in favor of the amendment could be counted on
to vote in favor of the insurgent southern delegations or, for that matter,
against Senator Taft's nomination, this vote added fertilizer to the germ of
the notion that Senator Taft could not be nominated on the first ballot. Its
impact was clearly reflected, for example, in the widely reported statement
of a beaming President Truman, who, when informed of the balloting on the
Fair Play Amendment, announced, "I'm worried. . . . It looks like my
candidate is going to get beat. " 79
While most of the convention delegates were involved in the flurry of
opening day activities in the Grand Ballroom at the Hilton Hotel, another
important event was taking place in the ornate setting of the Gold Room four
miles away at the Congress Hotel."s  The Credentials Committee was
holding its initial meeting. The members selected a pro-Taft chairman when
Ross Rizley, a former congressman from Oklahoma, prevailed over Warren
Burger of Minnesota, a Stassen man who had the backing of the Eisenhower
camp, by a vote of twenty-five to twenty.' 8 ' This vote was followed by a
unanimous decision to permit all information media, including television and
radio, to attend all committee sessions. " By this time, Senator Taft's
partisans, who constituted a majority of the committee members, had seen
the error of their ways and now supported the move as a method of "'cor-
recting a major error' of the National Committee executive group."'
Meanwhile, back at the Hilton Hotel, as Clarence Brown was struggling
to defeat Arthur Langlie's Fair Play motion, John Wisdom sat at the desk in
his suite several floors above the convention din pouring over the papers and
charts that he intended to use that evening at his appearance before the
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Credentials Committee. " The committee was composed of one representa-
tive from each of the forty-eight states and the five territories. With the
election of Ross Rizley as its chairman, most observers presumed that Taft
held sway with a majority of the fifty-three members.
The managers of the Ohioan's campaign, however, were not overly
sanguine about their ability to control the committee proceedings. They
knew that the designated representatives from some of the states did not
agree with their respective states' national committeemen on either the Fair
Play Amendment or the southern delegate contests. John Wisdom also was
aware of this fact, but his experience before the National Committee had
only reinforced his conviction that he was facing an uphill battle. Neverthe-
less, the earlier presentation in front of the National Committee, while not
resulting in victory, had been useful. He had now been through one "trial"
and had seen how his arguments, witnesses, and graphical displays had
played on the "jury." Had this been a traditional piece of litigation, of
course, he would now be preparing an appellate brief and getting ready for
oral argument. The Credentials Committee, however, was not the political
equivalent of an appellate court; it was more like another jury than a court
of appeals, particularly because Chairman Rizley had instructed both sides
to confine their remarks to the case that had been presented to the National
Committee. Consequently, Wisdom devoted himself to honing and refining
his argument and presentation of witnesses in the hope, though not the
expectation, of achieving victory in front of this new tribunal.
The hearing on the Louisiana delegation began at 9:30 on Tuesday
evening, July 8th,'1 in the Congress Hotel's rococo Gold Room. In an
effort to accelerate the pace of the proceedings, each side was given only
sixty minutes to make its case.18 Wisdom had sought the same ninety-
minute allotment that had been granted by the National Committee, but his
request was rejected by a twenty-seven to twenty-four vote."s Therefore,
he supplemented his oral argument with the 104-page printed brief that had
been submitted to the National Committee, as well as an oversized twenty-
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five page brochure entitled The Louisiana Story and his by-now legendary
collection of charts, graphs, affidavits, and other documentary evidence." s
As he had done before the National Committee, Wisdom chastised the
Jackson forces for their illegal tactics and their continual use of rump
meetings to thwart the true wishes of a majority of the voters at district
meetings.' 89 "We elected 13 of the 15 delegates," Wisdom maintained,
"using sincere registered Republicans. We will prove the shoddy tactics of
our opponents. The minority held rump meetings whenever they were out-
voted."" These meetings, Wisdom cracked, were worse than a kangaroo
court. "A decent, respectable kangaroo wouldn't be caught dead in such
meetings.""'' One of his witnesses, Elise Meyer, offered an effective
description of the mass meeting in Jackson's home, Twelfth Ward, where
delegates were elected to the district convention: "There was no election of
delegates at the meeting called by Jackson. The chairman simply an-
nounced, 'our delegates win, the meeting is over.' Mr. Jackson led a small
group out of the room and the lights were turned out. " " She then recounted
to the amused committee members how, after the Jackson group left, those
people remaining continued the meeting with the aid of flashlights in order
to choose "legal" delegates."
Wisdom's own remarks, carefully chosen and delivered in his deliber-
ate, New Orleans-accented voice, were clearly directed not only at the
members of the committee, but also at the much larger television audience
that was, in some respects, a more important jury panel. " "We are not sup-
plicants asking for favors," he insisted.195 "We are the legal delegates. This
is not just another southern contest. The hope of the Republican Party for
future growth in the South will rest on your decision and so also will the
integrity and moral soundness of the Republican Party. "1"
Jackson, aided by Shreveport attorneys Leroy Smallenberger and Phillip
Mecom, again belittled Wisdom's accusations, characterizing them as just
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in 1 TULANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 41 (1954).
189. See Rival, supra note 185, at 1.
190. Id.
191. National Affairs, supra note 153, at 15.
192. Rival, supra note 185, at 1.
193. Id.




1952 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
another attempt to contest democratically elected delegates in order to garner
some personal political clout. He also reasserted his claim that the Wisdom
faction included Democrats who had violated state law by participating in
GOP meetings less than six months after switching party affiliation and,
therefore, that Jackson's were the lawfully chosen representatives. 1 To
support this contention, Jackson offered only his personal opinion of the
applicable law. 198 In response to questions by committee members, Jackson
admitted that this opinion was not backed by a single Louisiana court
decision. Wisdom, on the other hand, did not rely on personal opinion.199
Instead, he proffered an official opinion issued by the Louisiana Attorney
General asserting that recently registered Republicans were not barred by the
statute from participating in party caucuses and conventions. According to
the Attorney General, the provision of the Louisiana statute that precluded
any individual from voting in a party primary until he had been registered
as a party member for a specified time period did not prevent those citizens
from participating in party caucuses, conventions, and meetings that
preceded general elections.
Jackson also attempted to raise a few issues that, Wisdom countered,
had not been proffered to the National Committee.Z Jackson's strategy
backfired as Chairman Rizley felt compelled to chastise Jackson for address-
ing matters that had not been raised before the National Committee and to
direct him to confine his remarks to the issue he had raised before that
committee.2° 1
During his portion of the Old Guard's presentation to the committee,
Leroy Smallenberger was asked about the decision by the State Credentials
Committee, under his chairmanship, to kick Wisdom's slate of delegates out
of the meeting.' In a naive, but perhaps less than helpful reply, Smallen-
berger stated, "We were fairly honest."2 3 At the first opportunity, Wisdom
offered this tart rebuttal: "Like virginity, there are no degrees of honesty."
The members of the committee listened carefully to the two arguments.
Despite the lateness of the hour, they continued to pepper both camps with
questions for several hours. Long past midnight, Chairman Rizley finally
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called a halt to the proceedings, adjourning the session until 8:00 that
morning without taking a vote.' Although some suggested that the lateness
of the hour compelled this decision, others proposed that the ruling was
made "to let the effect of Wisdom's hard-hitting arguments cool off. " 5
The Credentials Committee had not begun its consideration of the
Louisiana controversy until late in the evening of July 8th because it had
spent the earlier part of the day resolving the contest over the Georgia dele-
gation. The presence of a much smaller television audience at this late hour
also may have contributed t6 the timing decision. The contest, an all-
afternoon fight marked by "charges and countercharges of thievery,"
resulted in another win for the pro-Taft forces. The Credentials Committee
voted thirty to twenty-one to uphold the ruling of the National Committee
recognizing the Foster delegation.' The vote was, however, in some ways
misleading. Each state delegation, regardless of size, was entitled to only
one representative on the Credentials Committee." The delegations that
voted against the Foster faction actually represented 646 convention votes
(the Virgin Islands representative to the committee also signed onto the
minority report), substantially more than a majority of the 1,206 delegates
that would vote on the presidential nomination or of the 1,138 uncontested
delegates that were authorized to vote on delegate challenges when they
came to the floor of the convention.' Nevertheless, Taft was able to muster
the support of a majority of the committee members, and this compelled
Elbert Tuttle and the other Eisenhower leaders in Georgia to bring their
case, as John Wisdom would also be compelled to do, to the convention
floor.21 °
The brief morning respite that Chairman Rizley had provided the rest
of the members of the Credentials Committee after their marathon evening
session did little to stem the rising tide of opinion that Wisdom had generated
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in favor of his group's position. Several of the perceptive, experienced Taft
hands could feel the shift of momentum. Thus, in a last-gasp effort to turn
a potentially embarrassing defeat into a gracious compromise, the seemingly
peripatetic Clarence Brown asked his colleague from Massachusetts, Repre-
sentative John Heselton, to meet him in a nearby kitchen for some horse-
trading.2 Standing under a sign that read "Keep It Clean," Brown proposed
that the Taft supporters on the committee would vote in favor of Wisdom's
delegation if Eisenhower would accept Taft's twenty-two to sixteen division
of the Texas delegation."' Heselton, however, had been carefully instructed
by fellow bay-stater Henry Cabot Lodge to reject any and all offers of com-
promise in favor of Brownell's "all or nothing" blueprint. Brownell's
unwavering no-compromise strategy prevailed again.
To the astonishment of many and the consternation of some in the
room, however, the Taft campaign yielded on Louisiana in an apparent bid
for psychological advantage in the now-unavoidable convention floor tussle.
In what may have been a strategic retreat, 2 delegate T. Eugene Worrell of
Virginia, seconded by Clarence Brown, moved to seat the thirteen members
of Wisdom's delegation.214 All of the Taftmen on the Credentials Committee
then voted along with the Eisenhower faithful in support of the motion. The
unanimous verdict overturned the ruling by the National Committee just a
week earlier to seat eleven Taft supporters and only two backers of the
candidate from Abilene.2 5
Many contemporary accounts of this unanticipated turn of events
explained it as a ploy by the Taft managers to convince the convention
delegates to uphold the Credentials Committee's favorable decisions in the
Georgia and Texas contests." 6 By demonstrating their candidate's willing-
ness to compromise as well as his desire for party harmony, Taft's handlers
thought they could minimize the damage and encourage the conventioneers
to engage in some old-fashioned political horsetrading.2 7 Taft's announce-
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ment that he would abide by the Credentials Committee's ruling on the Lou-
isiana delegation and not appeal it to the convention was seen as an attempt
to pressure Eisenhower into making the same commitment with respect to
the Texas delegation.218 If this was Taft's game plan, however, Eisenhower,
and more importantly Brownell, was not interested. As spokesman for the
candidate, Senator Lodge immediately declared after the Louisiana vote that
the Credentials Committee's resolution of the Louisiana contest would not
alter his candidate's determination to present the facts concerning the
Georgia and Texas delegations to the attention of the assembled delegates.219
A somewhat different explanation was offered by Bayard Ewing, a
young attorney from Rhode Island who served as his state's representative
on the committee.' "The Louisiana Taft delegation is a stolen delegation,"
he insisted to the other committee members."' "We know it is. Is the
Republican Party going to swallow it?"' It was Wisdom's patient, but
hard-driving presentation that had convinced Ewing.' "It had the touch of
the [Tulane] law school," Ewing continued.z2 "And some of the older, self-
respecting lawyers on the Taft majority of the committee just couldn't go
against Wisdom's witnesses and evidence. "' Once former federal Judge
Dawson from Kentucky, Bill Stems of North Dakota, and Frank Whetstone
of Montana informed Chairman Rizley that they, along with Ewing, could
not ignore the overwhelming case tendered by John Wisdom, the Taft man-
agers realized they had lost four, if not more, of their twenty-nine votes.2
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Because the committee initially was split twenty-nine to twenty-three in favor
of Taft, "[w]hen [the Taft majority] saw that they would be beat[en], they
did the strategical thing; they made the vote unanimous." 7 Whatever the
motivation behind these final maneuverings and regardless of whether or not
they influenced the decision made by the individual committee members, by
relinquishing his claim to the Louisiana delegation, Senator Taft abandoned
John E. Jackson - the state's "Mr. Republican" for nearly thirty years -
and ensured the election of John Wisdom as the next national committeeman
from Louisiana.'
Bedlam erupted in the hearing room immediately after the representative
from the Virgin Islands cast the fiftieth and final vote in support of the
Eisenhower delegation. Well-wishers from every corner of the room
swarmed around Wisdom in an enthusiastic display of emotion and support.
In a matter of seconds, Wisdom was overwhelmed by back-slapping, hand-
shaking supporters, many of whom were weeping openly. Some of the more
athletic Louisianians eschewed the stairways and leapt over the railing from
their perch on the balcony to the floor below in order to join the celebration.
The throng became so thick so quickly that the short and slight attorney was
unable to escape the embrace of the jubilant mass and move from his counsel
table to offer a conciliatory word to his crestfallen rival. Realizing that
further attempts to restore order would be unavailing, Chairman Rizley
declared a brief, five-minute recess that lasted for nearly half an hour.
The next day, the thirteen Eisenhower supporters of the newly
recognized delegation caucused and ended John E. Jackson's eighteen-year
reign as national committeeman by electing Wisdom to that post by a
thirteen-to-two vote.39 They also replaced Mrs. Julia Grimmet Fortson of
Shreveport with Mrs. Violet D. Allen of New Orleans as the state's national
committeewoman 3 10 For some members of Jackson's now-disenfranchised
delegation, however, the finality of the defeat was difficult to swallow.
Hours after the Credentials Committee rendered its decision, a few of the
Louisiana Taftites remained in the convention hall, refusing to yield their
badges.3" The matter was straightened out, however, and Wisdom and his
slate of newly recognized delegates made their triumphant entrance onto the
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convention floor. In perhaps the only hitch in his intricate convention plan,
however, the band that Wisdom had arranged to play "When the Saints
Come Marching In" to accompany their arrival, "[either] forgot about our
arrangement or ... decided not to play it. "2
Taft's decision to yield on the Louisiana delegation cut the number of
major contests to two - Georgia and Texas.3 3 More importantly, because
the Credentials Committee vote was unanimous, no appeal by the Jackson
forces to the convention floor was possible.3' Party rules required the
presence of a minority report from the Credentials Committee in order to
bring an appeal. 5 After hearing of his loss of eleven Louisiana delegates, 26
Taft confidently stated that he still had enough to win the presidential
nomination. 37 Both sides fervently denied that any deal had been cut with
the Credentials Committee, and Thomas F. Coleman, floor manager for
Taft, publicly averred that the committee had decided the Louisiana case
strictly on its merits. 38 Yet, Coleman's denials of any such intent notwith-
standing, it appeared that the Taft camp was hoping to reap a psychological
advantage by yielding the Louisiana delegates. Apparently they reasoned
that their drive for the convention's top prize would be damaged more by
"steamroller" cries from the Eisenhower forces than by the loss of these
relatively few delegates from Louisiana."
On the heels of their face-saving gesture vis-a-vis the Louisiana delega-
tion, the leaders of the Taft campaign made clear that their willingness to
promote party harmony would not overwhelm their lawful claim to the Texas
delegation. To the contrary, the tilt over the Lone Star delegates was
reminiscent of the roller coaster struggle endured by the Georgia combatants.
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When longtime Texas GOP boss Colonel R.B. Creager died in 1950,
the battle to succeed him was fought between Henry Zweifel, a Taft sup-
porter from Fort Worth, and party newcomer J.H. (Jack) Porter, a Houston
oilman and Eisenhower devotee.2' At the precinct and county caucuses that
preceded the State Convention in early May 1952, Porter and his supporters
had outmaneuvered and overwhelmed the Taft forces by using Texas Demo-
crats favorable to Ike.24 Zweifel responded to this strategy with an attempt
to compel delegates to sign a party loyalty pledge.242 The ruse backfired,
however, as Porter encouraged everyone to sign the pledge that he believed
to be unconstitutional and, therefore, meaningless and of no legal effect.243
A frustrated Zweifel then felt compelled to employ a different tactic in his
battle against Porter's "one day republicans." 2' His choice was one with
which John Wisdom was intimately familiar - the Taft group held rump
precinct and county caucus sessions to promote the candidacy of their own
supporters.
When the Texas Republican State Convention finally convened at Min-
eral Wells on May 27th, the mood was bitter and ugly.245 By the time the
12,000 conventioneers poured into this small, spa town of less than 8,000
inhabitants, Zweifel had gone so far as to brandish Eisenhower with the
charge that the General was being supported by the Communist Daily
Worker. Backed by a compliant State Executive Committee, Zweifel had no
problem getting all but 30 of the 519 Eisenhower delegates thrown out of the
convention.' Once the Executive Committee's decision was affirmed by a
762-to-222 floor vote, the thirty Eisenhower supporters who had not been
locked out of the State Convention by the Executive Committee got up,
marched out of the hall, and joined Porter and the other excluded members
of his contingent in their own rump convention across the street.247
Back at the convention hall, the delegates voted in favor of Zweifel's
list of national convention delegates, a group consisting of thirty Taft dele-
gates, four who supported General Douglas MacArthur and four who
favored Eisenhower. 2' Meanwhile, the Porter group selected a slate com-
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posed of thirty-three Eisenhower delegates and five Taft supporters. 249 In the
end, the episode at Mineral Wells not only produced two rival delegations,
but also provided the Eisenhower camp with the inspiration for future
campaign slogans such as the "Texas Steal," "Rob with Bob," and "Graft
with Taft." The rancor also spilled over into the preconvention posturings
by both sides. When the train from Houston carrying Henry Zweifel arrived
at Chicago's Dearborn Station, he alighted from the railcar toting a huge
steel filing case that contained more than 1,000 documents to support the
case in favor of his delegation.' When informed of Zweifel's dramatic
entrance into the Windy City, Jack Porter retorted, "The Taft forces couldn't
get enough documentation in the hold of the Queen Mary to justify their
brazen steal of delegates in Texas. "251
A few members of Taft's campaign leadership recognized the potential
damage that the Mineral Wells episode could cause to their candidate, and
they hoped to finesse the problem by negotiating a compromise over the
contested delegates with their opposite numbers in the Eisenhower camp.
However, their efforts were rebuffed by Herbert Brownell, who perceived
the advantage in highlighting this escapade as another manifestation of the
moral decadence of the Taft campaign. Accordingly, Brownell instructed
Senator Lodge to undermine any attempt at a negotiated settlement. 2
The Eisenhower strategist made another correct call. The Mineral
Wells incident caused considerable controversy and consternation among
Texas Republicans, many of whom thought that the Eisenhower delegation
had been lawfully chosen through an election that permitted one-time Demo-
crats to participate in Republican caucuses or conventions by signing a
declaration of party affiliation.53 One immediate manifestation of this anger
surfaced at the Republican Governors' Conference that was being held in
Houston just as the Credentials Committee was meeting in Chicago.
The scheduling of the Governors' conference to immediately precede
the commencement of the official business of the party convention proved
to be extremely fortuitous for the Eisenhower forces. It offered them the
perfect opportunity to dampen the impact of committee decisions that they
had every reason to believe would be orchestrated to support the candidacy
of Senator Taft. By organizing the Governors into a pro-Eisenhower consti-
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tuency, Senator Lodge and his co-workers hoped to moderate, if not
counteract, the decisions of the Taft-dominated convention committees.-'
As it turned out, events could not have played more perfectly into Eisen-
hower's hands5 5 The combination of the Mineral Wells fiasco and the
National Committee's decision to impose a media blackout on committee
proceedings virtually assured the success of this maneuver. 6 In addition,
it certainly did not hurt the Eisenhower effort that H.J. Porter, leader of the
Eisenhower Texans, lived in Houston and had unrestricted access, particu-
larly at social occasions, to the Governors.'
It did not take long for the Governors to sense the level of indignation
borne by the Texans that they met at the various social events held in con-
junction with their business meetings." Along the way, Eisenhower
strategists decided that rather than ask the Governors to make an explicit
declaration of support for the General's candidacy, it would be easier and
equally effective to organize them around Eisenhower's fight for the Fair
Play Amendment to the convention rules. 9 The plan succeeded beyond
their expectations, as Governor Tom Dewey - one of the most influential
members of Eisenhower's upper echelon - was able to persuade all twenty-
five Republican Governors to voice support for the amendment.' Even
though three pro-Taft Governors later recanted, the damage to the Senator's
campaign had already been done." It generated a momentum in Eisen-
hower's direction that was never headed. Slowly but surely, Eisenhower
racked up a constant string of small victories, each building upon its
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Once the Louisiana celebrants had made their triumphant exit from the
Gold Room of the Congress Hotel, Credentials Committee Chairman Rizley
was able to resume the committee's agenda and move on to the Texas con-
test. As expected, the Taft-controlled committee voted twenty-seven to
twenty-four to divide Texas, ceding twenty-two delegates to Senator Taft and
the remaining sixteen to General Eisenhower. 2 This cleared the way for an
all-out battle on the convention floor. Senator Taft quickly hailed the com-
mittee verdict on Texas as putting the nomination "almost in the bag for
me." The General's troops offered their own confident prediction that the
Credentials Committee's decision would be overturned on the convention
floor and that the delegates would vote to seat a pro-Ike slate. They were
certain that their repeated charges finally were taking hold. John Wisdom's
thoroughly, documented and largely unrefuted claim that Senator Taft's
surrogates in Louisiana were stealing the election from delegates that had
been popularly elected by loyal, local Republican voters was having an
effect. The delegates were becoming increasingly willing to rebuke Senator
Taft and his campaign managers and to repudiate any member of the party
leadership who was seen as participating in the conspiracy.3 Herbert
Brownell succeeded in turning the nomination into a moral referendum, but
it was John Wisdom who provided the voters with all the evidence they
needed to make the correct choice. The time had come to vote on the Texas
and Georgia delegations.
The Georgia contest was first on the agenda. Chairman Rizley deliv-
ered the report of his Credentials Committee to the assembled delegates, and
it sparked a long and, in one instance, vicious debate. The Eisenhower
position was advanced by Ike's chief spokesman on the Credentials Commit-
tee, Donald Eastvold, -a former Washington State Senator and the party's
candidate for state attorney general. The lanky, thirty-two-year-old attorney
attacked the Taft campaign's reliance on the Georgia state court decision.
Evoking the old maxim, "Beware a young man with a book," Eastvold thrust
an old law book into the air and cited a Supreme Court decision for the
proposition that convention delegates, and not judges, must decide delegate
contests.
Taft's chief spokesman in this debate was a hometown hero - Illinois
Senator Everett Dirksen. After suggesting that the convention should defer
to the wisdom and judgment of the Credentials Committee, the usually
spellbinding Dirksen leveled a bitter, divisive ad hominem attack on the
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party's former standard bearer and Eisenhower stalwart, Governor Thomas
Dewey of New York. "When my friend Tom Dewey was a candidate,"
Dirksenjeered, "I tried to be one of his best campaigners. We followed you
before and you took us down the road to defeat."I Then, shaking. his finger
in the direction of the transfixed Dewey, who was sitting in the New York
delegation to the left of the speaker's rostrum, Dirksen added, "And don't
do this to us again. "' With that, the convention erupted. Dirksen's
remarks had struck a chord with the many delegates who had never forgiven
the former prosecutor from the Empire State. Although many of the dele-
gates voiced their agreement with Dirksen by joining in a tumultuous
outpouring of boos; others were outraged by this calculated attack on their
former standard bearer and began booing Dirksen. Dewey chose not to take
the bait and responded by slowly walking out of the hall.
Dirksen's eruption was certainly the emotional and perhaps oratorical
apogee of the convention. Nevertheless, the temporary frenzy created by his
remarks did not produce any lasting impact on the convention. If anything,
Dirksen's outburst, born perhaps out of a sense of desperation, proved costly
to the Senator's own political ambitions. After receiving the nomination,
Eisenhower met with Governor Dewey and the other members of his high
command to come up with a vice-presidential nominee. Someone mentioned
that Senator Taft had proposed Dirksen's name as a person who could heal
the party's wounds. This suggestion was summarily dismissed, with Gov-
ernor Dewey leading the charge.'
The exhausting debate was followed by a protracted roll-call vote that
included time-consuming interruptions to poll individual delegations. Even
the small territory of Puerto Rico got into the act. A tension-breaking
eruption of laughter engulfed the hall when a diminutive, bald, and bespec-
tacled attorney from San Juan, Romany Marcelino, demanded and obtained
a poll of his delegation's three official members even though, as was later
revealed, he was neither a delegate nor an alternate.2 67 Eventually, the
strife-racked convention was prepared to vote. By now it was nearly
midnight, and the exhausted, grim-faced delegates, looking more like sober
waiters at the end of a Mardi Gras ball than the invitees to the soiree, voted
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607 to 531 to overturn the decision of the Credentials Committee. 8 The
vote unseated the seventeen pro-Taft delegates and replaced them with Elbert
Tuttle's contingent that favored Eisenhower by a fourteen-to-three margin.m
The convention had just dealt a powerful and potentially lethal blow to
Taft's hopes for the nomination.27 Ike's campaign manager, Senator Lodge,
crowed that the Georgia decision made his man the winner of the party
nomination." "It leaves no doubt as to what the verdict will be in the case
of Texas and it is an unmistakable indication that Eisenhower will be
nomifiated on an early ballot," Lodge exclaimed.' Ralph McGill, editor of
the Atlanta Constitution, reported from the convention hall that the delegates
reinstated the "long-established and heroic Georgia Republicans headed by
Roscoe Tucker and Elbert Tuttle" and hailed it as a "great and warming
return to political morality. "73 And as Eisenhower partisans reveled in this
dramatic victory, even the most ardent Taftite had to concede that the vote
had decelerated, if not derailed, the Taft steamroller and tilted the scales
heavily toward the now-likely nomination of General Eisenhower. 4
John Wisdom sat back in his chair in the Louisiana delegation with a
broad smile on his face, comforted by the realization that all of the weeks
and months of tireless effort were finally paying off. His dedication to bring
about an end to the Jackson-dominated patronage machine through his relent-
less drive to show the nation how the Old Guard had systematically over-
ridden and ignored the democratic aspirations of the majority of loyal
Republican voters in Louisiana had inspired his fellow delegates to throw the
rascals out and usher in a new era of Republican politics. Not only had he
ousted John E., Jackson and provided Eisenhower with thirteen votes from
Louisiana, but he had set the stage for the delivery of the Texas and Georgia
delegations into the Eisenhower column. The combined forty-two votes
represented by these three states provided Eisenhower with his margin of
victory.
As the final minutes of July 9th gave way to the first moments of the
next day, the convention delegates turned to the Texas question. The
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lateness of the hour did not seem to dampen their enthusiasm for another
dogfight. A lively and highly partisan debate ensued, punctuated by claims
from both sides of "unholy alliances," "steamrollers," and "thievery."
Moments before the anticipated roll-call vote, however, the Taft managers,
in the wake of their defeat in the contest over the Georgia delegates and in
the sober recognition that they did not have the votes to prevail, decided to
abandon their pursuit of the Texas delegation and to permit a pro-Eisen-
hower Texas slate divided thirty-three to five to be seated by acclamation.'
Thus, when state legislator Ernest Palmer, Jr., a Taft leader of the Iowa
delegation, moved that the convention adopt the Credentials Committee's
minority report and give permanent status to the Jack Porter contingent, even
Ross Rizley, the committee chair, urged the delegates to overturn his
committee's ruling and vote in favor of Palmer's motion. 6 Ironically, this
Taft-initiated motion put General Eisenhower ahead in the delegate count for
the first time and gave tremendous impetus to the now seemingly unstoppa-
ble Eisenhower bandwagon.
Now stripped of forty-two votes as a consequence of his defeats in the
Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana contests and tainted by the claims of dirty
dealing associated with these tussles, Senator Taft saw his support rapidly
slip away. The scent of impending defeat wafted across the floor of the
International Amphitheatre, and it became increasingly apparent that victory
for Eisenhower was likely to come on the initial ballot. Even as Permanent
Chairman Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts, a former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, called the convention to order at precisely 11:31
that Thursday morning by banging a gavel that had been hewn from a rail
split by Abraham Lincoln, Herbert Brownell was sure that he had locked up
590 votes on the first roll call and that Eisenhower could count on the
defection of nineteen Stassen votes from Minnesota before the end of first-
ballot voting.tm Eighteen minutes later, at 11:49, convention secretary Mrs.
Charles P. Howard of Massachusetts began the call of the states, commenc-
ing with Alabama, which split its votes nine to five in favor of Taft."
When she called on Louisiana, Wisdom, surrounded by a throng of
exhausted but exhilarated friends, proudly announced that his state cast
thirteen "hard earned votes" for Eisenhower and two for Taft. 29
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When the first roll call of the states was completed, Eisenhower had
amassed 595 votes - nine short of the required majority of 604. Senator
Taft was clinging to a loyal 500. For the moment, then, the balance of
power rested with "favorite son" candidates such as Governor Earl Warren
of California, with eighty votes, and Harold Stassen, former Minnesota
Governor, with twenty. General MacArthur ran a bad fifth with ten votes.
Governor Warren's California delegation was prepared to hold firm in the
hopes of a deadlock. This left it up to Harold Stassen.
The Governor caucused his delegation and, in an emotional address,'
a teary-eyed Stassen released them from their pledge to support him on the
first ballot. 11 Convention rules provided that if a candidate did not receive
ten percent of the first-ballot votes, his delegates could choose to become
free agents. Therefore, according to a predetermined arrangement, when the
first roll call was completed and Stassen had not reached the ten-percent
threshold, but before the final ballot results were announced, Edward J.
Thye, the senior Senator from Minnesota, raised his state's standard in the
air in a request for recognition. Chairman Martin then dutifully called on
Warren E. Burger, a St. Paul attorney destined years later to become the
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.' Many accounts of the con-
vention indicate that Burger then announced the state's switch. In fact,
however, it was Senator Thye who grabbed the microphone and declared that
his delegation wished to retract its previous vote and cast all twenty-eight of
its ballots for Dwight Eisenhower. 3 These additional votes brought Eisen-
hower's total count to 614, ten above the needed majority. 4 Harold
Stassen's willingness to release his delegates had provided the final votes to
push Eisenhower over the top.' But, Eisenhower and Herbert Brownell
both knew that without John Wisdom's leadership, the pivotal southern states
would have remained in Bob Taft's pocket, and he, rather than General
Eisenhower would now be picking a running mate.
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On Wednesday, July 9th, two days before Eisenhower won the nomina-
tion, several of his key advisors met, for the first time, to evaluate possible
vice-presidential candidates. The clear favorite that emerged from this
meeting was the junior Senator from California, Richard M. Nixon.' In
fact, however, the courtship of Richard Nixon had begun weeks earlier.
More than one month before the convention, Senator Lodge had told Nixon
on the floor of the Senate that he was being considered for the second spot
on an Eisenhower ticket. In an effort to draw support away from Governor
Warren and in support of his own Fair Play Amendment, Lodge had sought
out the thirty-nine-year-old, first-term Senator from California. The strategy
worked. Nixon publicly decried the "Texas grab" and warned convention
delegates that the party would lose the general election if it did not recognize
the fairly elected Eisenhower-dominated delegation.' After a fervent
caucus fight, Nixon succeeded in wresting control over the California dele-
gation on this issue from its favorite son, Governor Warren, and committed
its votes to the Fair Play Amendment.'
That evening, John S. Knight, editor and publisher of the Chicago Daily
News, printed a story that Nixon would "probably" be Eisenhower's run-
ning mate. In response, Senator Lodge issued a statement indicating that
the issue of a vice-presidential nominee had not been discussed at Eisen-
hower headquarters.' It is unclear why Lodge felt compelled to issue this
"strategic denial.'2 g  Eisenhower's chief advisors knew that the General
was impressed with Nixon, and they agreed that the ticket could be enhanced
by Nixon's addition.29 Governor Dewey had come up with a list of attri-
butes of the perfect counterpart to Eisenhower, and Nixon filled them all.
Nixon's youth would offset concerns over Eisenhower's age.2' He was a
Californian, and this would appease voters concerned with Eisenhower's ties
to Dewey and other members of the eastern establishment.293 Finally, he
had a strong legislative record in Congress and had played a prominent role
in the anti-Communist drive during his career in the House and Senate.2
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"Every time you put those criteria into the computer, out would come Nixon
.1295
There was, however, another name being discussed by the Eisenhower
team. Nixon's senior colleague from California, Senator William F. Know-
land, was campaign manager for Governor Earl Warren and had placed the
governor's name in nomination for the presidency. Nevertheless, he was
still considered by many to be the most likely choice to share the ticket with
Eisenhower. However, Knowland had recently received the endorsement of
both the Republican and Democratic parties in California in connection with
his upcoming reelection campaign, and his certain re-election to the Senate
undoubtedly dulled his aspiration for the vice-presidential nomination.'
Then, the day before Eisenhower won the nomination, two new names
surfaced - Representative Walter H. Judd of Minnesota and Colorado
Governor Dan Thornton.29 These two now comprised, along with Nixon,
the first tier of nominees. A second array of possibilities was said to include
Senator Knowland, Governors Alfred E. Driscoll of New Jersey, Edward F.
Am of Kansas, Arthur B. Langlie of Washington, and Indiana Congressman
Charles A. Halleck.
298
Eisenower's nomination was officially proclaimed at 1:32 on Friday
afternoon, July 1 1th. That evening, he and Herbert Brownell dined alone.
In the course of the conversation, Brownell asked Eisenhower to provide a
list of names of vice-presidential candidates that he found acceptable. Eisen-
hower responded with a short list of five names: Richard Nixon, William
Knowland, Charles Halleck, Walter Judd, and Dan Thornton.2 9 Brownell
never showed this list to anyone because he knew that it would be unneces-
sary. 0
The following morning, Brownell assembled a group of just over twenty
key campaign leaders, including John Wisdom, Jack Porter, and Elbert
Tuttle, in his outer office for the purpose of coming up with a recommenda-
tion for the second spot on the ticket."°  Brownell initially chaired the
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meeting and informed those in attendance of Eisenhower's desire that they
provide him with a recommendation for the second spot on the ticket.2 He
also indicated that anyone who wished to be a candidate for that position
would have to leave. 3  Nobody stirred.' At that point, as Brownell
recalls, he left the room and retired to his office to stay in phone contact
with Eisenhower.' Senator Lodge then assumed control of the meeting,
although Brownell strolled in from time to time to see how things were
going."°  A few names, including Senators Taft and Knowland, were
mentioned but quickly rejected.Y At some point, someone indicated that
Senator Taft had proposed the name of Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen as
a running mate who could serve as a conciliator between the two party fac-
tions. However, considering that Dirksen's nemesis - Governor Dewey -
occupied a prominent place in the discussion, it is not surprising that this fell
on deaf, if not hostile, ears. As Governor William Beardsley of Iowae'
sniped, "After what he said I wouldn't wipe my feet on that fellow."3I Once
Governor Dewey proposed Richard Nixon's name, it did not take the group
much time to agree that he was the obvious choice. 1 The entire meeting
took less than an hour and culminated in the unanimous recommendation of
Nixon for the vice-presidential nomination.
Brownell never shared Eisenhower's list with the group of campaign
advisors because he had every reason to believe that the group was going to
recommend Richard Nixon. About two months prior to the convention, in
early May, Tom Dewey had told Brownell that he had been favorably
impressed by a speech delivered by Nixon at a dinner of the New York State
advisor, of New York; Senator Lodge and Congressman Christian Herter of Massachusetts;
Governor John Davis Lodge of Connecticut; Governor Sherman Adams of New Hampshire;
Governor Alfred Driscoll and Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey; Governor Fine and
Senator James Duff from Pennsylvania; Governor William Beardsley of Iowa; Governor
Theodore McKeldin of Maryland; Governor Dan Thornton of Colorado; General Lucius
Clay; Barak Mattingly and Roy Roberts of Missouri; Arthur Summerfield from Michigan;
Senators Harry Darby and Frank Carlson of Kansas; and Governor Langlie of Washington.
Id. at 121 n.6.
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Republican Committee a month earlier and that, in his judgment, Nixon
should share the ticket with Eisenhower.3 ' Dewey had insisted that Brown-
ell tell no one about it, and Brownell kept his promise." 2 With the full
knowledge that Nixon was the choice of the Dewey unit of the Eisenhower
brigade and keenly aware of Dewey's continued ability to wield influence in
the hurly-burly of party maneuverings, Brownell assumed that Nixon was the
likely choice of the party leaders. 3 In fact, he had gone so far as to predict
to Eisenhower during their dinner the preceding evening that Nixon would
be the name offered by the campaign leadership unless the General declared
a preference for someone else.3"4 Eisenhower made no such suggestion.
When Brownell took the group's recommendation to the nominee, Eisen-
hower accepted it without either jubilation or reservation.
Once Eisenhower had made his choice known, it took the convention
delegates less than half an hour to affirm it. Nixon's name was placed in
nomination by Senator Knowland, and as no other names were proffered,
Chairman Martin declared Nixon the winner by acclamation.I 5 This was the
signal for a brief demonstration in support of the nominee. Among the
demonstrators was John Wisdom, who had grabbed his state's standard and
joined the march down the aisles" 6 in support of the man who years later
would pass on the only realistic opportunity Wisdom ever had to be named
to the Supreme Court.
Dwight Eisenhower had now received the presidential nomination, and
John Wisdom had now vaulted into a powerful leadership position within the
Louisiana Republican Party. For the first time in modem Louisiana history,
there was real hope that the state GOP would be placed in the hands of a
leader who was interested in building a political force that could and would
compete, on a local and national level, with the Democratic opposition. Yet
as he boarded the train for home, John Wisdom knew that his vision of a
true two-party system in Louisiana was not yet a reality. Much of the most
difficult work lay ahead of him. Now, his primary assignment was to elect
the man whose nomination he had been so instrumental in securing.
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After a triumphant return to New Orleans, John Wisdom had to face the
fact that his success in Chicago could not be translated into a general election
victory in the absence of a unified party effort at the local and state levels.
Unfortunately, it became readily apparent within a short time that the rift
between his New Republicans and John E. Jackson's Old Guard had only
widened as a result of their preconvention and convention skirmishes. When
the State Central Committee met in Alexandria on August 17th, Wisdom was
unable to wrest control away from Jackson, notwithstanding his new status
as the state's national committeeman.
The position of Chairman of the State Central Committee had always
been a coveted and powerful post. Now, however, with the continuation of
the tug of war between Wisdom and Jackson, the stakes were even higher,
and the contest had become as much a matter of ego as a battle for political
power. Moreover, a rules change adopted at the Chicago convention had
further raised the ante. Intended as an effort to reward states that voted
Republican in gubernatorial or presidential elections, the new provision
increased the maximum size of the GOP National Committee and directed
that one additional seat be allocated to any state that either elected a Republi-
can governor or was carried by the Republican presidential nominee. Most
importantly, this additional seat was to be filled by the Chairman of the State
Central Committee.
The spectre of John Jackson's return to membership on the party's
National Committee as a consequence of a Wisdom-led Eisenhower
campaign victory in 1956 was enough to make John Wisdom's head spin.
Worse yet, the lure of a National Committee slot might even encourage
Jackson to seek the Central Committee chairmanship for himself. Even if
Jackson did not lay personal claim to that position, the re-election of his
deputy, Bryant James, would preserve Jackson's control over a National
Committee slot in the event of a party victory in 1956. Thus, it was more
important than ever for Wisdom to replace the current chairman with his
own man.
As he arrived in Alexandria for the first postconvention meeting of the
Central Committee, John Wisdom was well aware that much of his prestige
and his perceived ability to lead and unite the state party was tied up in the
battle over the Central Committee chairmanship. Unfortunately, he was
unable to replace the old guard Central Committee Chairman, softspoken
banker N. Bryant James of Farmerville, with his own man, Paulin Duhe, a
French-speaking sugar planter from the state's Cajun District.317
317. Although Paulin Duhe was an active member of Wisdom's New Republican Leader-
ship, his preeminent agenda was the promotion of the interests of the state's sugar planters.
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Although Jackson succeeded in placing his man in the chair of the
Central Committee, he was prepared to accede to the announced preference
of the national party. Accordingly, he terminated his efforts to promote the
now-defunct presidential candidacy of Robert Taft. This decision, however,
did not prevent a few of his low-level supporters from continuing their fight
against the victorious New Republican Leadership at the Central Committee
meeting. One of the least influential members of the Jackson camp, New
Orleanian Paul Marshall, moved to name Senator Taft and General Mac-
Arthur as the party's presidential and vice-presidential candidates." 8 Wis-
dom, however, had previously introduced a resolution to place Eisenhower's
and Nixon's names on the Louisiana ballots, and with Jackson's assent,
Chairman James ruled Marshall's motion out of order.3" This cleared the
way for a vote on Wisdom's motion, which then passed. Wisdom also was
able to obtain the committee's endorsement of his nominees for state cam-
paign chair and state finance chairman.. The mixed results led a frustrated John Wisdom to complain that Jack-
son's group was sustaining a "political rear-guard action, "I even as Bryant
James was proclaiming that the session had been marked by "harmony. "321
Rather than reflecting any remaining cleavage between the two camps, James
reassured his listeners that the split votes were "largely a matter of dif-
ferences of legal opinions. "I Former gubernatorial candidate Harrison
Bagwell of Baton Rouge agreed with Wisdom, however, conceding that
cooperation between the two factions was "impossible. "I
The balkanization of the party took its toll on the conduct of the post-
convention campaign. Even after the Central Committee officially endorsed
Eisenhower and Nixon as the state party's Republican candidates, members
of the two factions conducted distinct campaigns out of separate headquar-
ters. Wisdom's workers operated through his Americans for Eisenhower,
Consequently, he remained a liberal donor to both political parties and supported those
Democratic and Republican candidates who were supportive of the sugar industry. When
John Wisdom assumed his seat on the Fifth Circuit in 1957, he offered his first clerkship to
Paulin Duhe's son, John. John declined the offer, however, preferring to join a law firm in
Lafayette. Thirty-one years later, in 1988, John Duhe joined John Wisdom as a member of
the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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while the Jackson group functioned under the aegis of Republicans for
Eisenhower.' Throughout the remainder of the campaign, Wisdom and his
workers had to endure constant sniping at the activities of Americans for
Eisenhower from members of the Old Guard who were officially, if not
wholeheartedly, supporting the same candidate.
Wisdom's continuing battle against the Jackson loyalists was not his
only predicament. At the same time that he was striving to unify his party,
Wisdom had to confront another particularly knotty imbroglio - one that
pitted his support for Eisenhower against his commitment to the development
of a two-party system. Moreover, the dilemma in which he found himself
seems to have been of his own making.
Not too long after their return from the Chicago convention, Wisdom
and his New Republican Leadership group determined that Eisenhower's
chances of carrying the state could be enhanced if voters willing to support
the General were not asked to split the ticket in order to vote for their
preferred Democratic candidates for state and congressional offices.3' As
a general matter, there were few Republican candidates for these offices, and
that was also true in 1952. Nevertheless, by the time Eisenhower received
the nomination, Republican aspirants had already emerged in three of the
congressional races, as well as in the state public service commission race.
This placed Wisdom in a serious bind. As committed as he was to
promoting Eisenhower's candidacy, Wisdom's primary objective had always
been to promote the development of a true two-party system in his state.
Circumstances, however, now forced him to choose between these two
goals. Compounding Wisdom's predicament, the candidate for the second
congressional district, New Orleans businessman E.C. ("Tic") Upton, Jr.,
had agreed to run, prior to the convention, at Wisdom's urging.3' To make
matters worse, Upton did not make it easy for his friend when Wisdom
asked him to withdraw for the good of the presidential ticket. While all but
one of the other candidates acceded to the Republican Leadership Group's
request to terminate their candidacies, Upton rebuffed the private efforts of
some of Wisdom's colleagues and insisted that he would withdraw only if he
received an official request from the party leadership stating that his removal
would help Eisenhower carry the state.3'
Running in the second district, with its relatively sizeable Republican
registration, Upton reasonably concluded that an Eisenhower landslide could
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sweep him into office as well. At the same time, his Democratic opponent,
Hale Boggs, was an immensely popular and increasingly powerful national
figure. Wisdom feared that Upton's presence on the ballot could result in
many Eisenhower sympathizers voting for Stevenson to avoid splitting the
ticket. If Wisdom could prevail upon Upton, whom he had encouraged to
run in the first place, to remove his name from the ballot, Boggs would run
unopposed, and these Democrats could vote for Eisenhower without splitting
the ticket. Moreover, Harry Latter, the chief fundraiser and treasurer of the
New Republicans, had convinced Wisdom that eschewing a challenge to
Boggs would likely also avoid an anti-Eisenhower campaign by Boggs's
sizeable and well-financed legion of supporters.
Wisdom expected the race to be close. Consequently, he recognized
that Eisenhower needed every possible advantage. To discourage a serious,
qualified Republican candidate from running for Congress, however, was
anathema to Wisdom's cherished belief in the two-party system. In the end,
however, Wisdom resolved this Hobson's choice by determining that the
increased chance of an Eisenhower victory was worth the price. He
officially requested Upton to withdraw and Tic agreed.
Unfortunately for Wisdom, his reluctant gamble did not pay off.
Stevenson carried both the second district and the state in the general
election. The combination of a decades-long, traditional allegiance to the
Democratic Party and a deeply divided local Republican Party was too much
to overcome. Even so, and despite the fact that the New Republicans did not
have the resources to place poll watchers at many voting locations through-
out the state,3" Ike lost in Louisiana by only 38,000 votes. Thanks to the
ceaseless efforts spearheaded by John Wisdom and his New Republican
Leadership team, Eisenhower received 47.1 % of the total state vote - the
largest number of votes received, up to that time, by any Republican presi-
dential candidate in Louisiana history. Wisdom may not have been able to
deliver the state's electoral votes into the Eisenhower column, but he had
generated a base of support that would provide a solid foundation for the
development of a strong, cohesive political body. Finally, after more than
ninety years of electoral inertia, the Republican Party could honestly report
the existence of a viable organization in Louisiana.
Over the succeeding four years, under John Wisdom's leadership, the
membership rolls of the state party grew, as did its political potency. He
328. The value of having poll watchers present to guard against or to report voting
irregularities was vividly highlighted to Bonnie Wisdom by one of the state's chief engineers.
In response to her inquiry about the voting machines' susceptibility to tampering, the engineer
replied, "Lady, with a bobby pin I can make them sing."
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had no intention of resting on the laurels he had earned in the 1952 campaign
and could never remain satisfied with the recognition that he had played a
pivotal role in securing the nomination for General Eisenhower. After all,
Eisenhower's election had never been the preeminent objective of his politi-
cal efforts. As Wisdom had reminded the convention delegates in Chicago,
he and the other New Republican reformers "were in this fight primarily for
a two-party system, and secondarily for [their] candidate, Gen[eral] Eisen-
hower."329 This goal, however, could not be reached solely on the back of
an aggressive membership drive. The legislative deck was stacked too
strongly against such an effort. The recruitment of any significant number
of active party members depended upon the institution of statutory changes
designed to remove the roadblock that had impeded a Republican Party
resurgence for decades.
The primary target for legislative reform had to be the statute that
restricted party committee participation to individuals with five years of
prior, continuous party affiliation. Wisdom also believed, however, that
voters would continue to be discouraged from registering as Republicans so
long as each of the two major parties held separate primary elections in
which voting was limited to registered party members. There was little, if
any, incentive for Democrats to shift parties when the Democratic primary
was tantamount to a general election in these races. By staying where they
were, registered Democrats could continue to vote for the Republican presi-
dential candidate while retaining their ability to participate in the only
meaningful contest for local office holders by voting in the Democratic
primary. What was needed, Wisdom proposed, was an open primary system
in which all candidates for an office competed in a single election open to all
registered voters, regardless of party affiliation. This change would not only
encourage the development of a two-party system, Wisdom argued, but
would also be more efficient, less time consuming, and less costly than the
extant multiprimary scheme.
For two years, Wisdom struggled to reform a political structure that had
been erected and maintained to thwart the development of a true two-party
system in the state. His efforts, however, were only partially successful.
In 1954, he achieved a significant, though not total, victory with respect to
the five-year rule. The state legislature amended the election law to reduce
the five-year period to two years for membership on the State Central
Committee and to six months for service on parish committees." Wisdom
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was unable, however, to reform the dual-primary system. A bill that he
drafted to replace closed primaries with open primaries was introduced into
the legislative session, but it died in committee. Nevertheless, although
Wisdom's efforts proved unavailing during his political career, in 1975 -
nearly two decades after he had left the political arena and assumed his place
on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals - the Louisiana Legislature passed an
open primary law.3 31
Throughout his tenure as head of the state's Republican Party, Wisdom
continued to carry the call for a two-party system throughout the South. His
passionate commitment to this concept was, as it had always been, the
bedrock of his political philosophy and the driving force behind his partici-
pation in political affairs. In October of 1954, for example, Wisdom was
invited, along with Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and political
scientist Dr. Alexander Heard (a noted authority on southern politics), to
participate in a panel discussion on "A Two Party South?" as part of a
"Symposium on the Modem South" sponsored by the National Conference
of Editorial Writers at the Grove Park Inn in Asheville, North Carolina.
Faced with the opportunity to express one's deeply held views on such a
significant and serious subject to this important group of opinion shapers,
many speakers might have limited themselves to a series of cliche-ridden
attempts at profundity. That, however, was not John Wisdom's style. He
preferred the direct and carefully reasoned approach that he had developed
as an attorney, leavened by his wonderfully disarming sense of humor and
encyclopedic knowledge of history. John Wisdom did not shy away from
sprinkling his remarks with metaphors drawn from another of his passions -
sports.
The two-party system, Wisdom told his audience, was not only an
essential component to a vibrant democracy, but also an inevitable response
to a set of volatile social and economic forces. Although large numbers of
"presidential Republicans" had not yet been transformed into "year-round
Republicans," there was reason to hope and expect that the tide was begin-
ning to turn.
It's like getting up enough courage to go swimming in cold water.
I'm not very good at it myself. Personally, I'll take the west coast of
Florida or a good warm shower. Anyway, if you put your toes in cold
water and then your ankles, there is always a serious question whether a
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swim is worth it. But if you make the plunge all at once, and then become
active, it turns out to be a good idea after all. There are a lot of good
southerners who dipped their toes in the water in 1952. There are some
who got in up to their waist and then decided to get out. I do not know of
any southerners who had the courage to plunge in all the way who have
regretted it.
By 1956, Wisdom had solidified his position as leader of the Louisiana
Republican Party. Now known to many as the state's new "Mr. Republi-
can," he no longer had to deal with broadsides aimed at him from within the
party ranks and could concentrate on building party registration and pro-
moting the re-election candidacy of Dwight Eisenhower. With a united party
behind him and by combining its existing strength in the urban industrial
parishes of the state with a renewed appeal to black voters, the Wisdom-led
Republican Party carried the state for President Eisenhower by more than
40,000 votes. For the first time since 1876, Louisiana's electoral votes were
delivered to the Republican candidate.

